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Preface 
One of the objectives of IIASA's Project on the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) is to 
examine how fair and mutually beneficial agreements on transboundary environmental problems can 
be reached, especially between parties who each wish to satisfy their own interests and their own 
criteria of fairness and equity which may not coincide. Scientifically reasoned solutions to 
transboundary problems -- the type that IIASA models often generate -- may represent ideal answers, 
but are practical only if they satisfy the disputants* principles of justice and fairness. 
Thus, a critically important dimension of negotiation analysis must be to identify these basic 
principles and assess the opportunities for convergence in fairness beliefs among disputants. If this 
can be accomplished, the scientific tools used to explore alternate scenarios and strategies can be more 
sharply honed to reflect the realities of national interests and acceptability by framing the problem and 
reasonable solutions in a practical light. 
This paper reviews the literature and develops a framework for conceptualizing the role played 
by fairness in international negotiation. It is planned that applications of this framework will be 
performed concerning transboundary environmental conflicts. A prime candidate for application will 
be the case of long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe, where PIN Project staff can 
collaborate with analysts working on IIASA's Regional Acidification Information and Simulation 
(RAINS) model. 
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FAIRNESS ISSUES IN NEGOTIATION: 
STRUCTURE, PROCESS, PROCEDURES, AND OUTCOME 
Cecilia Albin 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What--if any--role do notions of fairness play in negotiations? Most of the literature on 
conflict resolution to date would lead the scholar to conclude that "rational" attempts to 
maximize individual gains is the only, or only predominant, force explaining the course and 
outcome of negotiation processes. In this competitive context, fairness arguments are 
supposedly used as a cover only, to couch the pursuit of self-interests at the expense of the 
other side. The conclusion of a particular agreement reflects the outcome of such a contest, 
and not the judgment that it is "fair." Reasoning along these lines--and the daunting task of 
initiating research on such a slippery concept, of which there is not at this point even a 
preliminary base of knowledge on which to stand--certainly explain to a large extent the 
scarcity of studies on the subject. 
Yet the actual practice of negotiation--including in areas of global significance, such as the 
environment--suggests that concepts of fairness often is an influential factor in many respects. 
Fairness notions influence the "give-and-take" in the bargaining process and help parties 
forge agreement. They determine extensively whether a particular outcome (agreement) will 
be accepted and implemented, and the extent to which parties will view it as satisfactory and 
thus honor it in the long run. Concepts of fairness may create a motivation to resolve a 
particular problem through negotiation in the first place, and will have an impact on the 
positions and the expectations which parties bring to the table. A limited body of research on 
negotiation, particularly experimental findings in social psychology discussed below, support 
most of these propositions. . 
One may, however, legitimately question the universal (cross-cultural) significance of fairness 
in negotiations: Is it a predominantly Western, perhaps even American, concept? Social 
psychological research strongly supports the proposition that the importance attached to 
fairness in dispute resolution spans across cultures, including non-Western ones (see 
Lind&Tyler, 1988), although different cultures and countries appear to stress different fairness 
principles. The applicability of these findings, most of which are based on laboratory 
experiments, to real negotiating situations, particularly in the international arena, remains to be 
explored. 
Fairness is undoubtedly used by parties in many negotiations as a means to justify and bolster 
their positions, and legitimize particular procedures or outcomes favoring their interests. In 
situations in which more than one fairness norm seems applicable, each party will ofien choose 
the particular principle--and interpretation of it--which best favor its interests. Such tactical 
uses of fairness, fiequently stressed by those skeptical of the concept, have been little 
researched and go beyond the scope of this paper. In most negotiations, however, genuine 
fairness notions must also play a role--for intrinsic (ethical) reasons, as well as practical ones 
spurred by self-interest. On the latter point, experimental findings demonstrate that parties 
frequently rely on fairness notions to distinguish between and evaluate alternatives for a 
solution; to coordinate expectations and forge consensus regarding an agreement; to ensure a 
stable agreement; and to foster good relations with the other side for future dealings. If for no 
other reason than to avoid constant confrontations and stalemates in negotiations--and the 
possibility that the other side opts for another avenue to serve its interests--each party must 
moderate its inclination to claim as large a share of the resources as possible and consider 
what the other side would regard as a fair and acceptable bargain. Like unfounded threats and 
promises, fairness would also lose its tactical value if parties did not attach a genuine 
substantive worth to the concept as well. 
The role of fairness notions will, of course, be more signficant or more prominent in some 
types of negotiations than in others, and the characteristics of such negotiations is yet another 
subject which remains unexplored in the research literature. Intuitively, one would think that 
fairness issues are particularly important in negotiations which continue over a period of time 
and thus build up expectations about "fair" behavior and the shape of a fair agreement 
(Young, 1992), as in environmental negotiations, arms control talks, and marriages; and in 
negotiations involving highly valued, scarce goods or ethical (e.g., life-and-death) issues. 
Fairness issues would also tend to be particularly manifest in situations in which benefits and 
costs are not easily distributed among parties--as in negotiations over many transnational 
environmental issues, and more specifically in the siting of hazardous waste storage facilities. 
Nevertheless, in most cases fairness will be at least one factor, among others, which explains 
the progression and dynamics of the negotiation process, the outcome, and its durability. 
Notions of justice and fairness, as they relate to negotiation, are truly interdisciplinary. 
Insights have been drawn notably fiom philosophy (e.g., Rawls, 1971), social psychology (e.g., 
Deutsch, 1973, 1985), mathematics (Steinhaus, 1948, 1950; see also Raiffa, 1982), and 
economics (e.g., Homans, 1961; Foley, 1967; see also Baumol, 1987). To the extent that the 
literature has discussed these specifically in the context of negotiations, the focus has almost 
exclusively been on the outcome--on different principles which may underlie negotiated 
agreements, or so-called "distributive justice". The prevailing point of departure in this 
literature, although rarely specified, is a distributive negotiation over a limited amount of 
divisible resources, and thus fairness has been examined as a distributive concept. 
Much less or no attention has been devoted to process and procedural fairness, particularly in 
predominantly integrative negotiations; outcome fairness in conflicts involving indivisibles 
(e.g., indivisible public goods, or benefits and burdens); the role of fairness notions in 
explaining the onset (or absence) of negotiations, as well as post-agreement negotiations; and 
relationships between types of fairness, such as procedural and outcome fairness. Most 
importantly, the limited literature on the subject to date has singled out a particular aspect of 
negotiations--usually the outcome--on which fairness notions have an impact, as if it were the 
only one. 
The present study attempts to begin outlining a "map" or framework for understanding the 
multiple roles which notions of fairness play in negotiations--in the structure, process, 
procedures, and outcome of negotiations. The few research findings available on the subject 
to date make it necessary to take a very broad, preliminary approach. At the same time, 
however, some important aspects of the major issues raised are examined in detail. These 
aspects include the different roles which fairness notions play in distributive and integrative 
negotiations, fair procedures in such negotiations, and possibilities of arriving at an agreement 
when parties remain committed to opposing norms and are unable to agree on a joint principle 
of outcome fairness (or a joint interpretation of it). 
2. DEFINING "JUSTICE" AND "FAIRNESS" 
The literature generally makes no systematic distinctions between the concepts of "justice" 
and "fairness." Work on negotiation, in particular, uses the terms interchangeably, sometimes 
as synonyms and sometimes with different meanings which remain unclear. Thus it may be 
usehl to point to some distinctions here. 
"Justice" can be thought of as a macro-concept which refers to general principles for the 
distribution of resources and obligations (costs, risks) in society as a whole. The focus is 
typically on the outcome (the details of the final distribution) rather than the process or 
procedures whereby it is produced--hence the term "distributive justice." A key characteristic 
distinguishing justice norms from fairness concepts is that justice norms have been established 
prior to and independently of any specific phenomenon to be judged--although the specific 
interpretation or application of these general norms at the micro-level is often far from 
obvious. 
Concepts of "fairness," by contrast, are more contextual and specific. These are individual 
(psychological) notions relating to a specific situation--a particular conflict, a particular 
negotiation, andlor a particular outcome. Fairness notions include views of how to apply any 
broader principle of justice regarded as pertinent in a particular context. In conflict and 
negotiation, views of the legitimacy and importance of one's own vs. the other side's claims to 
the disputed resources become another important element of fairness notions. Naturally, 
negotiators tend to view and refer to their own concepts of fairness as "justice"--that is, as 
critera reflecting some higher ethics which go beyond partisan perceptions and interests, and 
situational factors. 
Fairness issues, of course, raise the hndamental question, "Fair to whom?": fair to a 
particular party, fair to all parties, fair in the eyes of the world community, fair to hture 
generations, or to whom? In most cases, not at least to make agreement practically possible, 
the primary challenge is to get a process under way and produce an outcome as fair as 
possible for the group of parties involved as a whole and at the same time for the individual 
party--and to strike a "fair balance" between the two objectives when they are conflicting. 
Fair processes and fair outcomes are not necessarily acceptable overall, efficient, or even 
logical. Rather, fairness is an element of acceptability. Other factors which commonly 
determine whether a particular agreement will be regarded as acceptable include provisions for 
guaranteeing and monitoring its implementation, likelihood of enduring, possibilities of selling 
it politically to home constituencies, and built-in mechanisms for revision due to changed 
circumstances. Depending on the case, fairness may--or may not--stand in direct contrast to 
efficiency. Much has been written about the need for and problems of trade-offs between 
fairness and efficiency, particularly in public policy disputes such as the siting of hazardous 
waste storage facilities. It should be noted that some understandings of outcome fairness 
include efficiency considerations, and others, such as the "opportunities" norm (Pruitt, 1981), 
even equalize fairness with efficiency. These notions are hrther discussed below. 
Concepts of fairness--including interpretations of any applicable justice principle--are 
ultimately what will be important in negotiations, and this study will therefore focus on 
examining these. Specifically, we will distinguish between and analyze the role of four types 
of fairness in negotiation: structural fairness, process fairness, procedural fairness, and 
owcome fairness. In any one case, all these types will not be significant or even present. 
Outcome fairness is commonly thought to be a predominant concern in most situations. Yet, 
sometimes no outcome can be quite fair--as in the allocation of a single indivisible good or 
burden for which there is no adequate compensation, such as a death mission or a child in a 
custody dispute. Parties may then agree to use a particular procedure for settling the issue 
and to accept whatever (unfair) solution it produces. Under these circumstances, procedural 
fairness becomes extraordinarily important. Similarly, when a negotiation cannot be fair in 
important respects (e.g., permit participation by all parties or be open to public scrutiny for 
security reasons), greater demands will often be advanced regarding the fairness of its 
outcome. 
While analytically usehl, the four categories are not distinct even conceptually. An outcome 
viewed as fair may in effect be a fair procedure (e.g., for allocating a scarce resource on a 
continuous basis). Elements of structural fairness (or unfairness), such as the grouping of 
issues and distribution of power between parties, influence elements of procedural and 
outcome fairness; notions of outcome fairness, and the negotiation process itself, influence the 
choice of "fair7' procedures; and the use of particular procedures will in turn have an impact 
on the nature of the outcome. Some procedures (e.g., problem-solving techniques) may 
contribute to "neutralizing" structural variables such as power asymmetry, and others may be 
part of the structure themselves. Many of these, and other, relationships between the four 
types of fairness issues will be discussed further. 
3. STRUCTURAL ISSUES OF FAIRNESS 
We commonly think of fairness as relating only to the outcome, and perhaps also the process, 
of negotiations. Yet an important class of fairness issues concern the overarching 
structure of the negotiation process, which in turn reflects more or less the structure of the 
dispute and overall relations between parties. 
The components of the structure concern the conditions--the physical, social, and issue 
"constraints"--within which the negotiation process unfolds and within which the negotiators 
operate (Rubin&Brown, 1975; Faure&Rubin, forthcoming; Zartman, 1991). These structural 
components involve central fairness issues, for they have a considerable impact on the 
progression of the negotiations (e.g., the pattern of concession-making), the nature of the 
outcome, and judgments of the fairness of the outcome. For example, if the structure is 
viewed as weighing heavily against a particular party, this party is unlikely to regard the 
product of the negotiation as fair. Structural issues should be distinguished analytically from 
process fairness issues. At the onset of negotiations, the structural elements are typically the 
"givens" determined earlier in preparatory discussions or by extraneous factors. Most of them 
remain constant throughout the negotiation process, and influence the process in ways which 
may be difficult to discern but are nevertheless significant. 
3.1 Parties 
A major set of structural components concerns the parties to the negotiations, including any 
third parties: their identity; number; attributes, such as interests and amount of resources; 
representation; and relations, including the distribution of resources between them. 
Who are the actors in the dispute that ought (have a right) to be included in the talks? The 
importance of this question is illustrated by the old battle over whether Jordan, the PLO, or 
the Palestinians in the occupied temtories is the party to negotiate a settlement on the West 
Bank and Gaza with Israel. The significance of number is exemplified by Arab states' long- 
time insistence that the fbture of the Israeli-occupied territories be determined in a multilateral 
forum rather than in separate bilateral talks, as the former would provide a means to enhance 
their structural power position vis-a-vis the Jewish state. 
The idea that every (major) party to the conflict should be represented in the negotiations, or 
at least be given a genuine opportunity to be so, is regarded as a key element of fairness 
(Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987)--different from, for instance, the inclusion of actors in the 
process for their ability to otherwise veto an agreement. In negotiations over the siting of 
unwanted facilities, such as hazardous waste treatment plants and prisons, the participation in 
the process by neighborhood residents and other groups most directly affected by the decision 
is widely recognized as a fairness issue, which has shown to influence significantly public 
perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of the outcome and the chances of its 
implementation. The representation of non-governmental organizations in environmental 
negotiations permits groups directly affected by the outcome to take part in the process, and 
helps to raise the public's awareness of the issues involved so that it can in turn become more 
more active in that process. 
In some cases, however, it may not be practically possible to have all parties at the negotiating 
table, such as the larger public and future generations; and it may indeed be unfair to insist 
that others be at the table, such as children in divorce settlements. Then their interests are still 
to be represented somehow, even if only indirectly. Regarding the representation of future 
generations in international environmental negotiations, the issue today is not whether their 
interests are to be accounted for, but how can their interests be measured and who can 
represent them fairly (by states as is the case today or, for instance, by a formal transnational 
representative). 
The right of every party to fieely choose its own representatives to the talks is another 
structural fairness element, for limitations on this right typically serve to influence the course 
of the negotiations and the substance of the outcome in a particular direction. Examples are 
provided by the Middle East peace process resumed in late 1991: The condition that 
Palestinians form a joint delegation with Jordan, and the ban on full participation by East 
Jerusalemites and members of the PLO in this delegation, have served the objectives, 
supported by Israel and the United States, of leaving the issues of Palestinian statehood and 
the sovereignty over Jerusalem off the negotiating table. 
The presence and involvement of mediators and other third parties--a common occurrence in 
ethnic conflict--also raise fairness issues. Outside actors may serve to reinforce the existing 
structure--e.g., prevailing power relations between parties, and fair norms and rules agreed 
upon by parties to be followed in the negotiations--or to determine it initially--e.g., issues to 
be discussed and the site of the talks. However, outside actors can also change the 
fundamental structure of the negotiating process by adding their own interests and resources, 
and by altering the distribution of power in supporting one side to the conflict more than the 
other. In order for the process and outcome to be viewed as fair, the outside actor is then 
expected to use its special relationship with the favored side to move it toward an agreement. 
A third party can notably change an asymmetrical power structure into a more symmetrical 
one by "shifting weight" (Touval&Zartman, 1985)--for instance, by supplying the weaker party 
with information and expertise or with economic and military resources. 
Experimental findings suggest that parties which view themselves as roughly equal in power 
(defined as ability to move the other side through a range of outcomes) are more likely to 
negotiate effectively and arrive at an agreement than unequal parties (Rubin&Brown, 1975). It 
is reasonable to expect more specifically that under conditions of symmetry in resources, 
parties are more likely to negotiate in a way, and amve at an agreement, viewed as fair, and 
third parties can thus be constructive in contributing to the establishment of such a structure. 
A central difficulty in the international environmental area is to get serious negotiations under 
way and arrive at agreements regarded as fair, in view of the hndamentally asymmetrical 
positions of the industrialized and developing countries in many regards: responsibility for the 
problems at hand, costs of living with the problems vs. costs likely to result from regulatory 
agreements (i.e., need for agreement and motivation to negotiate at all), and resources 
available to reduce or eliminate the problems (including ability to bear the costs of regulatory 
agreements) (see, for example, Young&Wolf, 1992). A case in point is the negotiations 
between the United States and Canada over acid rain control (Schroeer, 1990). 
3.2 Issues 
A second group of structural elements concern the issues to be negotiated--their number and 
grouping as placed on the agenda (written or unwritten) when negotiations begin; their 
complexity and "sums" (degree to which they are, or are perceived as, zero-sum or positive- 
sum); and relationships between them (e.g., degree to which they are separate or intertwined). 
Often the grouping (packaging) of issues will be a "given" to a certain extent: Some issues, as 
in environmental negotiations and ethnic conflicts, are simply so closely intertwined that they 
can be usehlly discussed only together (e.g. Azar, 1983). However, there is always room for 
some choice as to adding related--or unrelated--issues. 
Such linkages raise important fairness issues. By grouping certain issues together on the 
negotiating agenda, the assumption and expectation are that legitimate trade-offs can be made 
between them. Further, linkages can be used to mobilize one side's power and leverage over 
the other side on some issue: Party A's willingness to make the necessary concessions and 
come to an agreement on a particular issue can be linked to party B's readiness to move and 
cut a deal on some other issue added to the negotiating agenda. Certain proposals for 
Jerusalem bring in the issue of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as a 
"concession," to elicit Palestinian acceptance of some form of permanent autonomy in the city 
under Israeli sovereignty. Critics hold that such a linkage is unfair: Jerusalem is of great 
importance to Arabs (Muslims and Christians) worldwide, and thus cannot be fairly exchanged 
for concessions on a predominantly Israeli-Palestinian issue; and the West Bank and Gaza is 
Palestinian land, whose legitimate return to Palestinian hands cannot be traded for another 
Palestinian-Arab area which is East Jerusalem. 
3.3 Rules 
Yet another category of elements is the rules and codes of conduct to govern the negotiations, 
and ways in which these are established. They include agenda-setting (e.g., issues to be 
negotiated, their order on the agenda, time allowed for each issue), communication 
procedures between parties and with the outside world (e.g., use of press conferences to 
report on progress or deadlocks), voting procedures, and the use of deadlines and other time 
limits. A common notion of fairness is that parties, whether equal or not in power, should 
have an equal chance to determine the agenda, equal control over the use of deadlines, and so 
forth. 
3.4 Physical Features of the Negotiations 
Finally, a major set of structural elements involving fairness issues concern the physical 
features of the negotiations: the location, the presence and degree of access of various 
audiences to the negotiations (e.g., the media, non-governmental organizations, the general 
public), the availability of communication channels between parties, and access to information 
and technical support. 
The site at which negotiations take place is known to influence parties' control over physical 
arrangements, and their psychological mood and assertiveness in the talks (Rubin& Brown, 
1975). Thus the selection of a neutral site (outside the home territory of either party or any 
close allies) or, if the negotiations are to continue over a period of time, alternation between 
partisan sites, is an important element of structural fairness. Openness of the site and the 
negotiation process to public scrutiny is widely viewed as another key component of fairness 
(Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987)--although such openness in many cases makes parties adopt 
more intransigent positions, impedes concession-making, and thus makes more difficult the 
conclusion of negotiated agreements (Faure&Rubin, forthcoming), including fair agreements. 
4. PROCESS FAIRNESS 
Processual fairness as defined in this study concerns two broad issues: the extent to which 
parties in the process of negotiating relate to and treat each other "fairly"; and how parties' 
notions of (outcome) fairness influence the dynamics of the negotiation process, including 
their choice of procedures for arriving at an agreement. After reviewing the first issue, we 
will examine the second subject at some length. 
4.1 Process Fairness as "Fair Behavior" 
"Fair behavior" in negotiations can be defined as the extent to which parties actually honor 
agreements reached on many structural issues before the process began, and the degree to 
which they use procedures without bluffing or deception in the effort to find a solution. 
Use of the first criterion to assess "fair behavior" leads to questions such as the following: 
Is every actor recognized as a party to the negotiation actually given an adequate chance to be 
heard and to have an input into the process at each stage, or is it discreetly marginalized in 
some way (e.g., by a mediator, by the physical arrangements at a location in the opponent's 
home country, by failures to share or communicate critical information correctly or in time)? 
Extensive research demonstrates that the ability of affected groups to actually have a voice in 
the negotiations is a central, if not the most important, element determining whether the 
process will be perceived as fair (Earley&Lind, 1987; Lind&Tyler, 1988). 
In negotiations over the siting of nuclear waste treatment facilities, for example, are 
representatives of affected communities really given the chance to be hlly involved 
throughout the process--from identifying the problem and inventing alternative solutions, to 
assessing risks and making the final siting decision (e.g. Susskind, 1990)? In international 
environmental negotiations, fair treatment of hture generations is viewed as requiring that 
their interests, however defined, are taken equally into account and are not subordinated to 
those of the present generation (Harvard Law Review, 1991). More broadly, fair behavior 
requires that the interests of parties which cannot take part directly andlor are not represented 
in the negotiations are consciously kept in mind, and that those present do not fall for the 
temptation of settling the problem at the former's expense (Lax&Sebenius, 1986). 
Further, are the rules of the game initially agreed upon actually followed (unless parties agree 
to change them)--e.g., regarding the use of deadlines, the time allotted to the discussion of 
each issue, and contacts with the media? Does any third party involved respect its mandate 
(e.g., as a fact-finder), or go beyond it (e.g., by attempting to enforce proposals of its own or 
demanding greater concessions from one side than the other)? Does the third party fUlfill 
expectations about impartiality, or about using any special relationship with one side to move 
it toward agreement? The centerpiece of 'fair behavior' by a third party is indeed to ensure 
that the process is fair in accounting as far as possible for the interests of all parties involved 
(Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987), and that every party is able to freely accept or reject its 
suggestions. 
Finally, are linkages (implicit or explicit) to new issues made in the course of negotiating to 
elicit concessions, in "unfair" ways? In negotiations over the siting of hazardous waste 
storage facilities and compensation to affected (host) comunities, it is commonly argued that 
demanding these communities to make trade-offs between safetyhealth concerns and 
economic considerations is unethical and unfair (Susskind, 1990). Some observers argue that 
the U.S. linkage of $10 billion in American loan guarantees to a fieeze on Israel's settlement 
activity in the occupied territories in the spring of 1992 was unfair, in politicizing and threating 
to cut supposedly humanitarian aid to Soviet immigrants in the country. 
Fair behavior also concerns the use of deceptive and coercive tactics. Many established 
procedures for reaching outcomes viewed as fair provide ample opportunities for using such 
tactics, to gain extra unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side. This is true about 
predominantly integrative as well as distributive procedures, as discussed below. When 
persistently and successfblly employed, such tactics in effect lead to unfair agreements without 
the knowledge of the exploited party (or no agreement is reached at all). These tactics include 
bluffing about real payoffs (e.g., in efforts to reach a Nash solution); the adoption of highly 
inflated positions with the expectation that "the difference" will then be split, unless parties' 
positions are knowingly inflated to the same extent; and exaggeration of the suffering or costs 
involved in any one concession (e.g., in relying on the norm of "equal sacrifices" to reach 
agreement) or of one's true needs (in relying on the norm of mutual responsiveness). In the 
use of a range of integrative problem-solving techniques, the centerpiece of fair behavior 
could be described as a will to give trutffil information, as required, about concerns and 
priorities; and to attempt to redefine the problem and invent options which may serve the 
interests of both sides. 
Is it always unfair to use deceptive and coercive tactics? One of the rare answers to this 
question makes a distinction between lying and misrepresentation with respect to one's 
interests and alternatives, as opposed to the substance of the items being negotiated. 
According to one criterion it is fair to use threats, misrepresent values, and so forth with 
regard to the former, but more rarely the latter, when all parties know and accept, explicitly or 
implicity, that such tactics are part of the rules of the game (Lax&Sebenius, 1986). When it is 
obvious fiom the seller's outrageous initial offer or subsequent readiness to drastically lower 
the price of a rug that he is misrepresenting his values, it is thus fair for the potential buyer to 
say that he has only $50 in the pocket when in fact he has much more, or to lie about his 
knowledge of other sellers with better prices. But it is unfair for the seller to withhold 
information that in fact it is not an authentic Persian rug and that it is slightly moth-eaten. 
Other suggested criteria concern larger implications of everyone using the particular tactic, the 
availability of other tactics which are less problematic ethically, and discomfort experienced if 
it became widely known that one had used the tactic or if the same tactic was used against 
oneself (Lax&Sebenius, 1986). Evidently, in many real situations it is very difficult to 
operationalize these standards. Yet these are usefbl distinctions which at least begin to spell 
out possible conditions under which commonly unfair tactics can indeed be fair. 
4.2 The Influence of Fairness Notions on the Negotiation Process: 
Distributive vs. Integrative Bareaining 
What role do fairness notions play in the process of negotiating? As discussed below, they 
will influence the choice of particular procedures for exchanging concessions or inventing new 
alternatives for an agreement. But more generally, do fairness concepts serve as instrumental 
"focal points" which coordinate expectations and concessions, and help parties forge an 
agreement worth honoring and implementing (Young, 1991b; Lax&Sebenius, 1986; Schelling, 
1960)? Or are they themselves, like "formulas" (Zartman&Berman, 1982), subject to 
bargaining and negotiation? Do they facilitate, or complicate, negotiation and agreement? 
This section suggests a number of propositions regarding the impact of fairness notions on the 
dynamics of the negotiation process under different conditions. There are two essential 
arguments: A distinction must be made between predominantly distributive and integrative 
approaches in examining the role of fairness; and fairness applies to integrative, as well as 
distributive, negotiations. In the limited research completed on the subject to date, fairness is 
examined only in distributive contexts with a focus on evaluations of the outcome--i.e., as 
arising only in situations in which the task of negotiation is to divide a limited bundle of 
resources between parties. The literature remains largely silent on the role of fairness notions 
in the process of integrative bargaining--sometimes with the explicit assumption that they are 
irrelevant in such negotiations. Although the creative and diffise nature of the integrative 
approach make the fairness issues involved much less manifest and difficult to analyze, they 
play as much of a role, although a different one, in that approach compared to distributive 
negotiations. 
From a number of significant works emerges the importance of distinguishing between 
integrative and distributive approaches in examining how other factors--e.g., power, interests, 
and the nature and number of the issues at stake--affect and explain the progression and 
outcome of negotiations (Walton&McKersie, 1965; Lax&Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; 
Nierenberg, 1973). In practice, most negotiations, while either predominantly distributive or 
integrative, will include elements of the other approach; and some negotiations, such as labor 
negotiations, will include a good amount of both. As recognized in a few negotiation models, 
even the most integrative negotiation must be concluded by distributing the joint gains created 
in the process of deliberation-a typically competitive phase in which each party attempts to 
reap last-minute unilateral advantages (Lax&Sebenius, 1986; Zartman&Berman, 1982; see also 
Andes, 1992). Conceptually, however, the two approaches are fundamentally different in their 
outlook on the nature and function of the negotiation process. In the literature the integrative 
and distributive approaches remain described in brief within the parameters of the study 
undertaken. Thus in this section we first define them more precisely, and then contrast them.' 
For analytic purposes, they are examined in their "pure" form. 
4.2.1 Fairness in Distributive Negotiations 
In the distributive approach, the essential function of negotiation is to allocate a B e d  
(limited) amount of disputed items (berwJits and/or burdens) between parties by narrowing 
the gap between their respective positions. The process is typically considered a one-time 
encounter to settle a single issue. In a linear fashion, parties move toward a compromise 
agreement by exchanging concessions on basis of or in reference to B e d ,  identijiable 
positions. Like the opening demands, values and interests remain unchanged in the process 
of negotiating. Only the bids, each suggesting a certain division of the total resources, 
change. There is no special focus on joint analysis of underlying concerns motivating these 
positions. 
Beyond the shared interest in reaping benefits from agreement, parties' stakes in the process 
are viewed as conflicting: One party's loss (e.g., a concession regarding some unit of the 
disputed good) is the other's gain. Thus parties pursue competitive strategies to maximize 
their private share of the total resources available within given constraints--e.g., the need or 
1 Parts of the following discussion of the integrative and distributive approaches build upon or 
are directly taken from Albin (forthcoming), chapter 1, "Approaching the Problem of 
Indivisibles: From Distributive to Integrative Negotiation." 
desire to consider issues of fairness. The range of possible outcomes and their respective 
payoffs are known to parties at the onset of the negotiation, and any one bid is evaluated and 
responded to on basis of the initial positions. Overall, the approach is deterministic in 
predicting the type of movement toward agreement, the range of possible outcomes based on 
payoff structures, and the final outcome as a point between parties' initial positions (e.g., 
Bartos, 1974, 1978; Cross, 1969; Walton& McKersie, 1965). The disputed goods are usually 
assumed to be divisible and possible to distribute without losing value, or at least to 
conceptualize in parts corresponding to the concessions made in the movement toward 
agreement. 
The concession-convergence model is the classic, and perhaps clearest, embodiment of the 
distributive approach. This is a linear notion of the negotiation process in which an overriding 
factor determines the progression of moves fiom the initial positions to the agreement. Each 
party's move or choice of tactic is a response to the other's previous step. In the work of 
Cross (1969), learning--that is, the way in which parties coordinate their expectations about 
their respective concession rates--is the key factor determining these moves and the nature of 
the settlement. In the famous concept of Nash (1950), parties in the process of negotiating 
tend to strive for a "fair" outcome in which the product of their utilities is maximized; i.e., any 
redistribution of the resources would decrease one party's gains more than it would increase 
the other party's gains. This is an outcome fiequently reached in experimental negotiations, 
according to several studies (e.g., Bartos, 1974). 
Fairness notions aflect and express themselves in distributive negotiations in a number of 
ways. First, together with other factors (e.g., interests, calculations of power, and the other's 
likely concessions), they influence each party's concept of its "bottom line"--the minimum for 
which it will settle in negotiations--which in turn influences its opening position and the 
degree to which this position is viewed as possible to compromise. 
Second, as each party presents its opening demands and considers those of the other side, a 
point of agreement viewed as desirable and fair often emerges somewhere in between the two 
positions. In the model of Bartos (1974), which more than any other model articulates what is 
usually left implicit about the role of fairness notions in distributive negotiations, this 
particular point is a split-the-difference solution exactly at the midpoint between parties' 
opening positions. Experimental findings suggest that this is indeed a commonly accepted 
notion of outcome fairness (e.g, BentonbkDruckrnan, 1973), for it demands equal concessions 
fiom both sides and thus is relatively easy to justifi and sell to home constituencies. 
If and when such a joint concept of a salient outcome emerges, it determines what parties 
view as fair concessions. In the movement toward the preconceived point of agreement, it 
guides the actual scope (size) and rate (number) of their concessions. Specifically in the 
model of Bartos, and in any negotiation in which specifically an equal-split solution is viewed 
as fair and desirable, parties strive for maintaining a midpoint between their original positions 
and subsequent offers. Thus, in distributive negotiations in which a joint notion of outcome 
fairness exists, it serves as an instrwnental coordinaor of expectations about concessions 
and the point of agreement. In these cases, unlike the case of integrative bargaining, fairness 
notions are not part of the negotiations but rather guide these negotiations (the essence of 
which is the exchange of concessions) toward the recognized point of convergence. 
Related conclusions supporting this proposition are found in a number of works (e.g., Pruitt, 
1981; Young, 1991b), many of them based on experimental findings (Schelling, 1960; Bartos, 
1974, 1978; BentonLkDruckman, 1973). Schelling's 'focal points' specifically are points of 
agreement which appear unambiguously as salient solutions to parties in predominantly 
distributive negotiations, often (but not always) by virtue of their perceived fairness. Typical 
focal points are relatively simple principles of fair division--e.g., split-the-difference, equal 
shares, and proportionality. They emerge as obvious and relevant because of precedent, 
analogy, custom, prevailing norms and cultural values, andlor some other factor which make 
them qualitatively distinguishable from other possible points of agreement. Apart from any 
inherent value attached to them, parties often settle at such focal points because an attempt to 
forge agreement at some other point within the bargaining range is expected to involve greater 
costs of some kind than gains (Schelling, 1960; Lax&Sebenius, 1986; cf also the idea of time 
costs and concession rates in Cross, 1969). For example, among workers who have jointly 
earned a sum of money, it would frequently appear natural and fair that the earnings be 
allocated proportionally to the number of hours worked. 
Further, a number of studies propose, based on experimental findings, that the presence of a 
joint salient notion of outcome fairness weakens zero-sum (win-lose) perceptions, speeds up 
concession-making, makes agreement more likely (at the prominent alternative), and decreases 
the impact of other factors on the dynamics of the bargaining process (Joseph&Willis, 1963; 
Benton& Druckman, 1973; see also Pruitt, 1981). These effects may be partly explained by the 
idea that a joint notion of outcome fairness helps to overcome the problem of "partisan 
biases9'--the tendency of parties to overvalue their own concessions and underestimate those 
of the other side (Fisher&Brown, 1988). 
Although rarely accounted for in the pertinent literature, there are certainly cases in which 
parties will not recognize an obvious point of convergence early on in the negotiations. They 
may even prove unable altogether to agree on the shape of a fair outcome--for example, 
because different cultures with different fairness norms, or great power asymmetries, are 
involved. Or parties may agree on a common principle of outcome fairness--such as equality 
or proportionality--but not agree on a specific interpretation or the applicability of it--for 
instance, what is to be treated equally or what are the relevant contributions. 
Obviously, in these cases, notions of outcome fairness cannot serve as instrumental or 
coordinating focal points. However, inability to agree on a joint principle of outcome 
fairness, or a joint interpretation of it, does not necessarily mean thQt agreement will be 
impossible. Parties may instead agree to: 
--use some (in their eyes) fair procedure for amving at an agreement--e.g., reciprocation of 
comparable concessions or divide-and-choose (see the discussion of "procedural fairness" 
below); 
--somehow strike a balance ("split the difference") between their competing principles of 
outcome fairness (e.g., Young, 1991a); 
--base the outcome on the fairness notion of one of them (e.g., as a result of successful 
persuasive tactics by this party, the lesser importance attached by the other party to its fairness 
principles, andlor a weaker party's need or will to forgo its fairness norms due to its great 
dependency on an agreement); 
--conclude and honor an agreement for other reasons than the particular fairness norms it does 
or does not incorporate; 
--move to an integrative mode of negotiation, in which divergent notions of fairness may be 
overcome by redefining the problem, or may provide terms of trade and even facilitate an 
agreement (see the discussion of the integrative approach below). 
Regarding the last-mentioned avenue, it is reasonable to expect that divergent fairness 
notions, which are derived from fbndamental values viewed as impossible to compromise, will 
make negotiation virtually impossible--if distributive in outlook and based on positions. 
Experimental findings suggest that opposing interests rooted in core values make positions 
inflexible and agreement very difficult @ruckrnan&Zechrneister, 1973). Under these 
circumstances, the ability to reach an agreement at all would require a shift to a more 
problem-solving process away from the formal negotiating table. When parties do not share 
the same fairness notions, the advocated approach of "principled negotiationn--aiming at 
using negotiating procedures and reaching outcomes which are 'objectively' fair (Fisher&Ury, 
1981)--will be constructive only in such an integrative context, as discussed below. 
So far we have discusssed the role of notions of fairness--"fairn concessions and "fair" 
outcomes--in distributive negotiations. One may legitimately question the extent to which 
there is anything inherently fair about these notions--both conceptually and in real cases. 
Clearly, the opening positions are of crucial importance in distributive contexts, in influencing 
or determining what will be viewed as a fair agreement and fair concessions (Bartos, 1978:20). 
Typically the approach does not adequately question the justice of the initial positions taken-- 
or any differences between parties, such as in need or in entitlements to the disputed 
resources--as noted in a small number of works (IklC, 1964; Schelling, 1960; 
Druckman&Harris, 1990). For the concessions and the final agreement to be genuinely fair, 
one of the assumptions is that parties' initial positions are equally "reasonable" or equally 
inflated (or minimalist), given their respective payoffs. 
One suspects that in many cases, as concluded by Schelling (1960:72-73) on basis of his 
relatively simple experiments with individuals, the prominence of a particular fairness notion 
comes less fiom any innate moral force, and more fiom its known appeal and power to 
coordinate expectations, to forge agreement in ambiguous situations of multiple alternatives, 
and then to legitimize the outcome before important constituencies. This is particularly true 
for simple notions of fairness, such as split-the-difference and equal shares, which are taken at 
face value for "impartial justice." Clearly, fairness notions have played these important 
hnctions in some negotiations. They include territorial boundary disputes, as well as arms 
control talks (see, for example, Druckman&Harris, 1990). In SALT I and SALT 11, various 
notions of equality clearly marked the progression and outcome of the deliberations (Zartman 
et al., forthcoming; Talbott, 1980). 
However, one may question the extent to which these roles of fairness typically depicted in the 
distributive model actually apply to many other types of negotiations--those involving, for 
example, central ethical issues, multiple and complex issues, many parties, and disparate 
conditions, including resource inequalities. Examples of such negotiations concern global 
environmental issues and ethnic conflict. In these cases, parties and their constituencies often 
seem not to accept ready-made concepts of fairness, or they regard their divergent fairness 
principles as "indivisible" in that a compromise cannot be struck between them. 
Thus parties are led into a search for a unique integration of and balance between a number of 
principles and norms, which take into account their respective conditions and circumstances. 
The only coordinating force is the joint interest in producing a fair solution, in the broadest 
sense. The resulting agreement, if successhlly concluded, involves a complex formula which, 
in the beginning and throughout the negotiations, is all but obvious or prominent--but at the 
very core of the negotiations themselves. This was the case of the negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. A similar 
process of combining several fairness norms has been proposed for negotiating successhlly a 
global warming agreement (Young&Wolf, 1992) and an agreement on the political status of 
Jerusalem (see discussion below). This brings us to the issue of fairness in more integrative 
contexts. 
4.2.2 Fairness in Integrative Negotiations 
How do fairness concepts relate to integrative negotiations, the essence of which is the 
creation of "win-win" solutions which supposedly eliminate the need for compromises? How 
do the roles they play differ from the roles of fairness notions in distributive bargaining? 
Before addressing these questions, we must first define and articulate the integrative 
approach. 
Integrative models view the essence of negotiation as creating or discovering new--i.e., 
hitherto unknown or not considered--options which combine (divergent) interests into an 
agreement by redefining or modrfiing them. Two or more issues, or sub-issues, are under 
contention; interests are partly overlapping, partly opposing; and the overall process is 
positive or varying sum in that one party's gain does not entail an equally great (or any) loss 
for the other. Contrary to the idea of bargaining as a competitive process of give-and-take, 
parties jointly explore concerns at stake, the perceptions and evaluations of which areflexible. 
Possible options for a solution are generated through such tools as brainstorming or formula 
construction, and then analyzed and compared. In this process, parties reassess and modifjr 
notions of their concerns--including notions of fairness--and ways of meeting them. The 
integrative approach does not necessarily assume that the disputed resources are divisible. 
Concessions are made in reference to a particular option or formula for a solution rather than 
established positions, and only once such a joint referent point has been accepted by parties 
based on their individual security points. The possibilities of gains from agreement are not 
considered inherent in the nature of the issues under consideration or otherwise 
predetermined. Being explored in the negotiation process, these possibilities depend 
extensively on parties' own problem-solving efforts ,and skills (e.g., Zartman&Berman, 1982; 
Lax&Sebenius, 1986). 
Unlike the linear movement foreseen in distributive models, parties may move back and forth 
in the negotiating process as they explore options and influence each other in different 
directions. The negotiation is not treated as a one-time encounter: There already exists 
sufficient trust to reveal interests and priorities, and strengthening parties' relationship for 
hture dealings may be an objective of the dialogue in itself. While structural factors, such as 
power (a)symmetry and time costs, may give a sense of the range of likely outcomes, the 
integrative approach is essentially nondeterministic: The dynamics of each negotiation are 
unique, and its outcome is an unpredictable creation reflecting a combination of new values. 
Integrative strategies produce agreements with high joint gains, provided that parties do not 
yield excessively but maintain high aspirations (moderately high security points) regarding 
major concerns (Follett, 1942; Pruitt&Lewis, 1975). Such agreements permit all parties to go 
home with the feeling that they "won" on important matters, although not necessarily to the 
same extent. Technically, integrative and distributive solutions may look the same: They 
become integrative by virtue of, in parties' eyes, combining their hndamental concerns. 
In the pioneering work of Follett (1942), one of the most frequently quoted examples of 
integration captures well, in all its simplicity, a basic concept of the approach. A visitor to a 
library wants the window open, while another wants it closed. Further discussion reveals that 
one wants it open for ventilation, while the other wants it closed to avoid a draft. The 
concerns of both individuals are hlly met not by keeping the window half-open or open some 
of the time, but by opening a window in the next room. This episode portrays the important 
message that solutions may be invented which eliminate conflict altogether. This became the 
definition of "integrative" for Follett and her followers: Beneath apparently opposing 
positions, often reinforced by misperceptions of the other's goals and intentions, may lie hlly 
combinable interests (see also Fisher&Ury, 198 1; Pruitt&Rubin, 1986). 
When perfectly integrative solutions meeting all demands and interests can indeed be found, 
fairness judgments and issues are more seldom invoked simply because parties got everything 
they wanted. Still, such solutions, which Follett's story of the library window exemplifies, 
could be viewed as fair in two respects. First, they achieve a kind of equality between parties 
and treat them fairly by h l l y  meeting the concerns of each (based on individual values and 
utilities). Second, the creation of such solutions frequently relies on the use of "fair" 
integrative techniques, discussed below. 
Perfect integration is in reality seldom possible, as noted in a small number of subsequent 
studies, but most agreements are at best "partially integrative".2 The approach rather entails 
that parties'core concerns are met, but concessions and compromising are still necessary on 
less essential matters. In this process, as distributive negotiations focus on methods of 
division, the integrative approach relies extensively on the concept of exchange: Parties 
value, or can be brought to value, the same item differently so that each party may, to their 
mutual gain, trade concessions on its less-valued items for concessions on items it values 
more. A major task of negotiation is indeed viewed as bringing into the open or creating such 
different evaluations of disputed resources, to make trading possible. Exchange strategies 
(discussed below) build upon the classic theorem of sociologist Homans: "[tlhe more the 
items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other 
and goods valued more by the other party than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of 
successfL1 outcomes" (Homans, 1961). They are reminiscent of the law of comparative 
advantage in economic exchange, according to which parties trade to their mutual advantage 
as long as their combinations of tastes and endowments differ. 
Apart fiom the norms of fair behavior discussed earlier (e.g., use of creative skills for the 
benefit of all parties, supply of truthful information about interests and priorities), fairness 
concepts enter the process of integrative negotiation at two critical stages. First, they play a 
role in the joint exploration and identification of possible trades for mutual benefit. In this 
process, parties do not only ask themselves if a particular trade is mutually beneficial. Each 
party also asks itself if a particular trade is "fair" in what it asks the party to give up and 
what it ofers to give that party in return for the sacriBce. The resources being traded are 
valued differently, and attempts to objectively determine whether the exchanged bundles of 
goods are equivalent become irrelevant. However, each party must feel that the total of what 
it receives in the exchange justifies what it is asked to give away (based on its own 
evaluations). Ideally, each party also feels more generally (based on its own evaluations and 
what it knows about those of the other side) that the other party contributed about as much to 
the exchange, and that they gained about equally fiom the agreement. Outcomes tend to be 
viewed as unfair if they leave one party far better off than the other, despite the teaching that a 
2 Yet the development of partially integrative agreements is often referred to as a separate 
strategy--e.g., "bridging" (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt&Rubin, 1986). 
party's own alternative to an agreement is the proper basis for measuring how well it did in a 
negotiation. 
We commonly think that a joint notion of fairness is required for amving at a negotiated 
agreement. In integrative negotiations, however, parties do not value things in the same way 
and thus have divergent notions of what constitutes fair trades--what is fair compensation for 
a particular sacrifice. Indeed, at the heart of the approach is the exploitation of any 
"...differences among negotiating parties---in what they have and under what conditions they 
have it, in what they want and when they want it, in what they think is likely and unlikely, in 
what they are capable of doing, and so forth" (Lax&Sebenius, 1986:105). These differences 
may concern interests; priorities among issues, possessions (resources), and capabilities 
(skills); attitudes toward the passage of time and risk-taking; and expectations or beliefs, 
including probability assessments (Lax&Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Fisher&Ury, 198 1). 
It is an intriguing proposition that specifically divergent concepts of fairness, like other 
differences between parties, could provide t e r n  of trade and facilitate agreement in 
predominantly integrative negotiations. This idea has only been alluded to before (Sebenius, 
1984; Lax&Sebenius, 1986). It will be discussed and exemplied below in the context of 
integrative procedures, but deserves much more development and testing on actual cases. For 
now we only mention in passing one case in which the terms of trade, or a larger formula, for 
an agreement incorporated more than one notion of fairness, and indeed divergent concepts of 
fairness, which increased joint gains. This is the case of the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone Layer. For the developing countries, a fair solution must not penalize 
them for a problem caused essentially by the industrialized world. Indeed, at the heart of their 
notion of a fair agreement was the principle of need--of compensating them through technical 
and financial assistance and other special provisions for accepting regulation of emissions 
which, foremost among the costs involved, could hamper their development. At the core of 
the North's notion of fairness was equity--expressed in the proposed reductions in emissions 
proportionally to each country's current level, and the foreseen final regime accepting and 
preserving the North's much higher emission levels and keeping those of the South low. 
Thus, parties do not enter integrative negotiations with fixed positions or detailed notions of a 
desirable outcome which, in the distributive version, so often provide from the outset a salient 
solution at which to aim. Indeed, it is the absence (real or perceived) of a single, salient 
solution viewed as fair which motivate parties to engage in integrative negotiations in the 
first place. This makes the task ofjointly determining what fairness rwrm(s) are to underlie 
an agreement part of the negotiations themselves--and sometimes a significant part. Even if 
parties initially have some tentative concepts of what a fair outcome should look like, these 
notions are modified and sharpened in the process of reframing the problem and exploring 
new options. 
As noted by Schelling (1960:69), the "obviousyy or salient outcome, including the fairness 
notion(s) on which it is based, depends greatly on how the problem is formulated, and 
what precedents and norms that definition brings to mind. In distributive negotiations, the 
problem is already defined by the time formal talks get under way. By contrast, redefinitions 
and reformulations of the problem are at the core of integrative bargaining, which give rise to 
new sets of possible trades, new prominent alternatives, and new definitions or measurements 
of fairness which cannot be predicted beforehand. 
The terms of trade, and the particular fairness notion(s) they are to incorporate, are often at 
the core of negotiations over a larger formula to define the problem and the guidelines for its 
solution. This has been the case in many Middle East and environmental negotiations (see 
Zartman&Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1992). The formula agreed upon then serves at once as a 
mechanism for amving at an agreement, and as a framework for the substance of a fair 
solution. In addition, by virtue of reconciling divergent interests and providing criteria of 
fairness, the formula is a procedure for both increasing joint gains and allocating them fairly. 
The formula may incorporate a joint notion of outcome fairness (e.g., equity, equality, or 
need), a combination of or compromise between different fairness principles, or even 
divergent principles which then provide the terms of trade.3 
Fairness issues also enter into the process when the general terms of trade agreed upon are to 
be practiced or implemented in detail. Thus, each party asks itself for each element of the 
accord: Is this a fair interpretation of the terms? Is the substance of the concessions I am 
demanded to make fair considering the outcome we have in mind? This is the "detail phase" 
foreseen in the formula-detail model (Zartman&Berman, 1982). More generally, one may 
view this phase as concerned with allocating between parties the joint gains created in the 
inventing, or formula, phase. Each party will ask itself if, based on its own evaluations of 
3 A common and important element of a formula is fairness. However, a formula also needs 
to be realistic, effective or relevant, comprehensive, verifiable, and so forth. In some cases a 
formula can be accepted and successfblly implemented without incorporating any fairness 
principle(s) or on grounds other than fairness--for example, because the political or other 
costs of non-agreement are very high (Spector, 1992). 
the resources, it receives a "fair share" of the jointly created benefits. At this last stage of 
the negotiations, the terms of trade serve as a coordinator of expectations and concessionr, 
as notions of outcome fairness do in the distributive approach. However, the core of 
integrative negotiations remains the elaboration of these terms in the first place. 
4.2.3 Why Be Concerned with Fairnes Issues in Integrative Negotiations? 
If we accept the proposition that fairness issues are as important, although different in nature 
and less manifest, in integrative negotiation, we may still question the worth of learning more 
about the theory and practice of the integrative approach in the first place. 
Many analysts have stressed the relevance of the distributive approach in describing the 
concession-making that occurs in, for example, labor-management negotiations over work 
hours and wages, and in international disarmament talks (Walton&McKersie, 1965; Jensen, 
1963)--that is, over divisible resources. Clearly, in some disputes only distributive tactics may 
be possible--for example, if they involve a single issue with no possibility of linking it to others 
or breaking it into sub-issues. Further, compared to the integrative approach, distributive 
negotiation typically involves lower costs--for example, in the form of effort, time, and risks 
regarding the sharing of information about true interests and priorities. Therefore, in conflicts 
involving high time costs, divisible resources, little trust, and/or poor communication between 
parties, a distributive approach may be preferable and may even yield a Pareto-optimal 
solution maximizing joint gains. 
Yet more mutually satisfactory and stable agreements tend to result when parties move from 
distributive to integrative negotiations, as noted by several scholars (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt 
&Rubin, 1986; Zartman, 1991). Particularly under any or a combination of the following 
conditions, integrative negotiation is more likely to result in an agreement, and in an 
agreement of high joint benefit: Highly valued resources (or burdens) are involved ,which 
cannot be compromised, or cannot be distributed easily or at all between parties, as is the case 
in many environmental and ethnic disputes (Albin, 1991; Burton, 1986; Azar, 1983); time costs 
are relatively low and aspirations high, and the conflict is long-lived and deeply rooted (e.g., 
PruittLkLewis, 1975); the necessary will and skill exist to use integrative techniques, including 
a preparedness to reveal any required information about interests and priorites; and parties 
value or expect to depend on cooperative interaction with each other in the fbture--integrative 
negotiation tends to reduce the sense of conflicting interests, and strengthen parties' 
relationship (Ben-Yoav&Pruitt, 1984). 
The research literature has applied integrative analysis chiefly to disputes in the areas of labor- 
management, business, and public administration (e.g., Follett, 1942; Walton& McKersie, 
1965; Lax&Sebenius, 1986; Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987), and interpersonal and family 
conflicts (e.g., Mnookin&Kornhauser, 1979; Pruitt&Rubin, 1986). These are areas in which 
parties are already bonded in long-term, valued relationships, and thus have incentives to 
accept the extra efforts and other costs involved in integrative negotiations until the process 
(if successfbl) has started to pay OK A small body of work has begun to apply the approach 
to internutional and transnational conflicts --e.g., ethnic, environmental, and economic 
disputes in which parties depend on each other for achieving recognition, dealing with 
environmental pollution, and receiving essential commercial goods (Sebenius, 1984; Zartman, 
1986; Raiffa, 1982; Burton, 1984,1986; Azar, 1986). 
Nevertheless, the study and practice of integrative bargaining in the international sphere 
remain neglected. There is no body of knowledge comparable to the experimental and 
empirical research completed on conditions, processes, and tactics relevant to the creation of 
integrative solutions in interpersonal and business-related conflicts (see particularly Pruitt, 
1981; Pmitt&Lewis, 1975; Walton&McKersie, 1965; Froman&Cohen, 1970; Ben-YoavLkPruitt, 
1984). The absence or existence of integrative potential has tended to be viewed as inherent 
(unchangeable) in a particular situation--notably in the nature and number of items under 
contention, the compatibility or opposition of parties' objectives and their orientation or 
attitude toward the negotiation, and the availability of information. Thus distributive 
bargaining has been described as the natural course resulting from a win-lose orientation in 
parties, lack of information about genuine needs, "issues" rather than "problems" being on the 
agenda, and a fixed-sum payoff structure (Walton&McKersie, 1965). In this vein, mistrust, 
lack of problem-solving attitudes or skills, large and cumbersome delegations, and states' 
continuous efforts to become less dependent on each other, even at considerable cost, provide 
some explanations for which integrative negotiation is not practiced more internationally. 
A number of recent studies have stress how distributive situations can be transformed into 
integrative ones to enhance the prospects of successfbl negotiations, including in the 
international arena. Methods drawing on concepts of exchange, resource expansion, and 
contidence building are described to demonstrate how redefinitions of issues andlor changes in 
attitudes necessary for such transitions can be brought about, including with the help of third 
parties (Touval&Zartman, 1985; Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987; Zartman&Berman, 1982; 
Fisher&Ury, 198 1). Here, the virtues of the options under consideration, more than any innate 
properties of the parties or interests involved, determine the extent to which a situation is 
zero-sum or positive-sum. The fbndamental message is that many situations carry more 
integrative potential than may be immediately apparent or commonly assumed. This is 
particularly true for many international negotiations in view of the complexity, large number, 
and maneuverability of the issues involved (e.g., Sebenius, 1984).4 
Fairness issues figure prominently in environmental, ethnic, and other transnational disputes, 
the management and resolution of which will depend extensively on successfbl negotiation in 
the coming years. In most of these disputes, parties will not enter negotiations with a joint, 
salient notion of outcome fairness which can guide them to a solution through the exchange of 
incremental concessions. Rather, these are conflicts in which parties are bound to remain 
entrenched in divergent notions of fairness--and in which attempts to produce a common 
notion of fairness, to strike a compromise between competing norms, or to reach agreement 
without basing it on fairness principles may prove futile. Successfbl negotiation in many of 
these cases may depend largely on the use of integrative techniques: on redefining the 
problem and/or constructing formulas which balance divergent fairness principles and thus 
accept or even exploit differences. 
Herein lies the significance of fbrther developing the integrative approach, examining more 
thoroughly how fairness issues figure into that approach, and researching how elements of it 
can be practiced more deliberately and more widely in international negotiation. 
5. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
This type of fairness concerns the specific mechanisms used for arriving at an agreement.5 
Being employed in the negotiation process and directly influencing its dynamics, these 
procedures could be viewed as raising a subset of process fairness issues rather than separate 
ones. The essential and usefbl distinction is that procedural fairness concerns the features of 
4 When lack of trust or other factors inhibit parties from sharing information about needs and 
priorities, integrative outcomes can still be achieved--e.g., through resource expansion, 
compensation provided by a conceding party itself, linkage of issues, and the use of "trial-and- 
error" approaches in choosing among known integrative alternatives (see PruittlkRubin, 1986 
and PruittlkLewis, 1975). 
5 This is a more narrow definition than that typically found in the literature, which uses the 
terms "procedural" and "process" fairness interchangeably to refer to the (perceived) 
fairness of the negotiating process generally (including, for example, whether concessions are 
reciprocated and whether every party has a voice in the process). 
the mechanisms themselves, while process fairness (also) refers to the larger issues already 
discussed, such as how parties actually use these mechanisms (e.g., if in good faith without 
bluffing) and the substance of their respective concessions. 
Procedures are considered fair by virtue of some intrinsic value (e.g., they give parties an 
equal chance to "win" or demand equal concessions from parties), by virtue of tending to 
produce fair outcomes, or by both. They may be more diffise and difficult to observe, such as 
reciprocation, or more clearly defined and manifest, such as tossing a coin and divide-and- 
choose. In some cases procedures have been determined prior to the talks, and can be 
considered part of the established "rules of the game" and the overall structure of the 
negotiations. For example, the reciprocity norm is incorporated in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provides much of the structure for negotiations over trade 
liberalization. It permits protectionist measures (e.g., countervailing import duties) against 
countries which subsidize their exports or engage in other trade practices deemed unfair. 
Further, in such trade negotiations an explicit rule is that a cut in the import tariffs of any one 
country (increasing its imports) should be balanced fairly with equivalent foreign tariff cuts, 
allowing for a roughly equal increase in its exports (LindertdkKindleberger, 1982). 
In this section we distinguish between two categories of procedures: distributive procedures 
and integrative procedures. The nature and role of the two types of mechanisms are quite 
divergent. Yet in many negotiations, and particularly in complex ones involving multiple 
issues and parties, procedures of both kinds are used.6 
5.1 Distributive Procedures 
5.1.1 Reciprocity 
As suggested in the earlier discussion of the nature and purpose of distributive negotiations, 
many procedures are mechanisms governing the exchange of concessions to arrive at a 
division of a limited bundle of goods. A major category of distributive procedures are 
variations of the principle of reciprocity; that is, mutual responsiveness to the other's 
concessions or position (e.g., Cross, 1978; Walton&McKersie, 1965). Many procedures based 
on reciprocity tend to be used when parties view themselves as equal in power, recognize a 
6 An example is the Law of the Sea negotiations (see Sebenius, 1984). 
mutually prominent solution to their dispute, andlor specifically foresee an agreement based 
on equality. 
These include equal concessions, whereby parties exchange comparable concessions in 
reference to their initial positions (e.g., Bartos, 1978); equal sacrifices, whereby parties make 
concessions causing them to suffer equally from their respective (subjective) points of view 
(Pruitt, 1981, 1972; Kelley, Beckman&Fisher, 1967); and matching or tit-for-tat, whereby each 
party responds to the other's last move by matching it in substance and scope, thus responding 
to toughness or softness with the same amount and kind of toughness or softness (Pruitt, 
1981). According to the procedure responsiveness to trend, each party makes concessions 
based on its evaluation of a series of moves by the other side (SnyderLkDiesing, 1977), 
whereas in the case of comparative responsiveness each party acts based on a comparison of 
its own and the other's tendencies to concede @ruckman& Bonoma, 1976; 
Druckman&Hams, 1990). In the case of asymmetrical concessions, a presumably weaker 
party responds to a stronger party's concessions with relatively larger concessions. 
Studies based on laboratory experiments with individuals demonstrate that these procedures-- 
the equal concessions norm in particular (e.g., Benton&Druckman, 1973)--are common 
patterns of concession-making in negotiation. In a study unusual in evaluating models of 
reciprocity in six actual cases of international negotiations--five arms control talks and one 
base rights negotiation--the comparative responsiveness norm corresponded best to parties' 
moves @ruckman&Hams, 1990). More generally, these studies contribute fbrther evidence 
that negotiators have a strong desire for fairness in the negotiation process. 
Reciprocity procedures are commonly perceived as fair because their use is expected to lead 
to a particular, preconceived outcome viewed as fair. For example, experimental findings 
show that when a split-the-difference agreement (based on initial positions) is foreseen, the 
procedure of exchanging equal concessions tends to be used. But even in the absence of 
agreement on a particular outcome, the reciprocity nonn is widely regarded as intrinrically 
fair (e.g., Ikle, 1964; Zartman, 1991; Gouldner, 1960)--and even as "one of the universal 
'principal components' of moral codes" (Gouldner, 1960). Yet, it is not necessarily the 
impartial procedure it is so often portrayed to be. This is particularly true about reciprocity 
interpreted as equality, which thus demands equal concessions (sacrifices) from parties. As 
noted earlier, the exchange of equal concessions will lead to a fair (equal-split) outcome only 
when parties' initial positions are equally far from their respective security points, and the 
problem of "partisan biases" is avoided. 
5.1.2 'Fair-Chance' Procedures 
Another major category of distributive procedures could be termed "fair-chance" procedures: 
They grant parties a supposedly fair (and often, but not always, equal) chance to "win" the 
negotiation--that is, to get all or a good part of the disputed resource, or be relieved of it in 
the case of a burden. In contrast to unstructured negotiations, these procedures are typically 
games with clearly defined rules, highly codified interaction, and a fixed set of possible, known 
outcomes.7 They do not involve negotiation in the sense that concessions are being 
exchanged or divergent interests reconciled: The outcome will typically consist of a winner 
and a loser as in, for example, arbitration procedures. After the fact, even if recognizing that 
its chance to win was fair, the losing party will rarely feel that the outcome is fair. Thus an 
implementation of the outcome will often depend on enforcement mechanisms. 
These relatively mechanical, straightforward procedures would often be used when there is no 
salient, fair solution and parties cannot agree on the nature of a fair solution; when the 
situation is too complex to determine what a fair agreement would be (e.g., Hopmann, 1991); 
when a solution is needed quickly; and/or when the stakes are relatively low (i.e., it is not 
worth using a complex, time-consuming procedure). They are also recommended and actually 
used when the stakes are so high that hll-fledged bargaining and negotiation would seem 
inappropriate or unethical, or involve too many pressures and pain; when the greater 
ambiguity and manipulability of most other procedures are to be avoided; and when no 
outcome can be quite fair no matter how sophisticated and successhl the negotiation (e.g., the 
allocation of a mission involving very high risks of death). 
Some procedures are random methods--e.g., tossing a die, flipping a coin, or arranging a 
lottery. They usually reflect fairness understood specifically as equality: Initial equal 
entitlements to the resources and no (or equal) information about the other's evaluations are 
assumed, and parties are given an equal chance to win. However, in using some of the 
methods the odds of winning can be construed to reflect divergent initial rights and other 
fairness norms--such as proportionality and need. 
While perhaps appearing at first as too simple and crude to apply but to more trivial disputes, 
they are recommended and actually used in a range of significant political and social contexts 
7 See hrther Brams (l990), PrasnikarLkRoth (1992), and Raiffa (1982) regarding game 
theoretical notions of fair procedures and propositions regarding the role of fairness in 
negotiations. 
involving conflict of interests (see Elster, 1989). Indeed, random procedures are often viewed 
as fair when "...the outcome is either of very small or very great importance to the 
recipients" (Eckhoff, 1974, as quoted in Elster, 1989) andlor the disputed items, whether a 
desired resource or a burden (e.g., high risks), are indivisible. As a means to ensure fairness 
with regard to risk sharing and the siting of hazardous waste storage facilities, for example, 
lottery systems have been recommended to decide which sites among qualified candidates are 
to be exempted from fbrther consideration (Kasperson, Derr&Kates, 1983). Lotteries are 
fbrther used for distributing dangerous tasks in, for example, the military. Serious arguments 
have been advanced for employing lotteries or tossing a coin to settle indeterminate child- 
custody disputes fairly, to avoid the emotional harm to children of lengthy litigation and 
negotiation (Elster, 1989). 
In cases of divergent evaluations and unequal initial entitlements to the resources, random 
procedures are often inefficient in letting parties end up with what they value the most or with 
something that roughly corresponds to their initial entitlements. Nor do such winner-takes-all 
solutions foster long-term, good relations between parties, particularly not when they value 
the goods highly. Raiffa (1982) notes, however, that randomization can be used to establish 
initial ownership, and then be followed by bargaining which may reduce or even eliminate such 
negative side effects. 
Another procedure is to arrange an auction to determine which party values the disputed 
resources the most (see Young, 1992). The resources would be given to the highest bidder, 
with the possibility of compensating the other party in some form. While perhaps appearing at 
first as a dynamic translation of the principle of equity (proportionality), the procedure is not 
always a good means to compare parties' evaluations. Uneven knowledge between parties of 
their respective values opens the possibility of strategic bidding. Further, auctions really 
measure both the ability and willingness to pay. Thus the procedure cannot assess fairly the 
worth attached to a particular good when parties differ in their capacity to pay what they are 
actually willing to pay. Yet a type of auction procedure has been used successfblly in the 
siting of hazardous waste facilities among volunteer communities: Interested neighborhoods 
have bidded against each other, based on their respective arguments and proposals for "fair" 
compensation packages for hosting a facility (Susskind, 1990). 
Still another procedure is divide-and-choose. It refers to the old custom of how to deal with 
two children fighting over a cake (or some other divisible good) which they both want. They 
agree (or their parents decide) that they will divide it by having one of them cut the cake, and 
then letting the other choose the first piece. Thus the child cutting the cake will be induced to 
do so fairly, otherwise the other child will choose the larger piece. This mechanism was used 
successfully in the complex Law of the Sea negotiations to determine the allocation of mining 
sites in the deep seabed (Fisher&Ury, 1981; Sebenius, 1984). 
The procedure normally assumes that the resources at stake are perfectly divisible and 
similarly valued; or, if valued differently, that parties have no information about each other's 
preferences. If valuations are divergent and the party doing the cutting knows the other's 
preferences (and acts rationally to maximize self-interests), it will often be able to divide in a 
way that gives itself the larger share: The divider creates one part which the chooser values 
just slightly more than the other part, which the divider values much more and thus assures for 
itself.8 Like other distributive procedures, divide-and-choose may solve the problem of fair 
division, and it could also be a means to achieve the state of "superfairness" discussed below. 
However, it does not by itself (other than by chance) exploit any differences in parties' 
preferences to their mutual benefit, in the sense of giving them the shares they value the most. 
A suggested variation on the divide-and-choose procedure is to have parties negotiate a 
division arrangement before knowing or deciding which part or role each will have (e.g., 
Fisher&Ury, 1981)--a notion of procedural fairness which goes back to Rawls (1971). It is 
inadequate in measuring interests and particularly divergences among interests, and will often 
fail to produce a satisfactory solution of high joint gains in the many instances in which parties 
value things differently. The so-called theory of intergenerational equity endorses it as a tool 
for determining the rights and obligations of current vs. future generations in the 
environmental area (Weiss, 1989). Yet it does not account for the fact that the value which 
future generations will place on important resources may not be the same as the worth they 
have to current generations, due to technological developments (Harvard Law Review, 1991). 
One type of negotiation for which this variant of divide-and-choose is recommended is 
divorce negotiations. In divorce cases, parents' preferences regarding the trade-offs between 
child-rearing responsibilities and money-related issues vary fiequently so as to permit mutually 
beneficial linkages. Thus, no parent may be ready to trade child custody for visitation rights 
alone; nor will any parent normally give up custody opportunities fully or below a minimum 
- 
8 There are ways to neutralize the advantages of being the divider and thus make the 
procedure as a whole fairer (see Young, 1991b). Divide-and-choose could also be used to 
allocate indivisible goods, if a sufficient amount of divisible resources are added (see 
Crawford& Heller, 1979). 
level for anything. However, as long as enjoying "enough" custody or the particular custody 
tasks he or she values the most, one parent will often be ready to exchange some custodial 
responsibilities for concessions on other issues in the divorce settlement--e.g. matters of 
alimony, marital property, and child support (Mnookin&Kornhauser, 1979; Mnookin, 1985). 
Such integrative solutions not only increase parents' gains from agreement; they also greatly 
benefit the children involved. Unlike fair-chance procedures which are not followed by 
negotiation, they also give parties a self-interest in honoring the agreement and thus depend 
less on enforcement mechanisms. 
In combination with an "additive scoring system" accounting for divergent preferences, 
however, the divide-and-chose procedure may yield solutions which not only are fair but also 
give each party more than half of the original value of the cake. This is shown by Hopmann 
(1991) with regard to multi-issue international negotiations such as arms reduction talks. 
5.2 Integrative Procedures 
The previous discussion has already touched upon some procedures used in predominantly 
integrative negotiations. The fairness issues raised by these procedures, as by the integrative 
approach generally, are by nature subtle and difficult to define precisely. Yet there are two 
basic reasons for which many integrative procedures can be called and viewed as fair. First, 
they have an intrinstic value of fairness in seeking to elicit balanced and truthful information 
about core concerns underlying parties' stated demands and positions, andlor in identifiing 
new options which can better meet all parties' essential concerns. Second, when used 
successfully, integrative procedures tend to produce outcomes viewed as fair by virtue of 
satisfying the vital interests of both (all) sides, although parties do not necessarily gain to the 
same extent from the agreement. 
A classic work on negotiation stresses how the criteria whereby negotiators evaluate what 
demands are "reasonable," what kinds of trades are "equitable," and what compromises are 
"fair" are but perceptions and beliefs which are "continually modified by the bargaining 
process.---[]:It is the negotiation that develops and changes them" (Ikle, 1964: 167). In many, 
if not most, conflicts and negotiations, parties' stated principles of fairness are opposing and 
apparently irreconcilable. Integrative procedures purposefully aim at making parties reframe 
their definition of the conflict--including their notions of the fairness issues at stake--in a way 
that it becomes conducive to a mutually acceptable and gainfbl solution. In this sense, parties' 
notions of fairness become an integral, and often central, part of the negotiations themselves. 
Research to date has developed essentially two groups of integrative procedures. Very few 
procedures in either category are designed to address fairness issues specifically, but they are 
clearly applicable and constructive in this regard. The first group consists of more or less 
structured approaches for improving communication and trust between parties, changing their 
zero-sum perceptions of each other's objectives and the nature of their conflict, and building 
confidence in the possibility of finding mutually satisfactory solutions. Examples are 
"controlled communication" (Burton, 1969) and "problem-solving workshops" (e.g., Burton, 
1986; Doob, 1970; Kelman, 1972, 1987), "diagnosis" and the creation or identification of "ripe 
moments" (Zartman&Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1986, 1989), and the development of 
"superordinate goals" and "fbnctional cooperation" (Sherif, 1958). 
The second group consists of specific techniques for reframing conflict situations and creating 
new, integrative solutions. They include "expanding the pie" (Pruitt&Rubin, 1986; Pruitt, 
1981; Walton& McKersie, 1965), that is, adding more of the same goods that are disputed in 
conflicts derived fiom resource shortage; "logrolling" or linkage of issues (Pruitt&Rubin, 
1986; Pruitt, 198 1 ; Sebenius, 1984); "fbnctional strategies" (Albin, 1991); "dovetailing" 
(Fisher&Ury, 1981); "trial-and-error"approaches and formula construction (Zartman&Berman, 
1982; Zartman, 1992); "mutual responsiveness" whereby the solution to a problem favors the 
party whose needs are most strongly felt or affected by it (Pruitt, 1981); and cost cutting and 
other forms of compensation, related and unrelated (Pruitt&Rubin, 1986; Pruitt, 1981).9 
What can be done when parties remain deeply committed to opposing, apparently 
irreconcilable notions of a fair solution? How can such fairness notions be negotiated? These 
are key questions which have received virtually no attention in the research literature. 
Therefore the applicability of one particular integrative approach is examined here in more 
9 Raiffa (1985) gives an example of how compensation can be used as an integrative strategy 
in negotiations over the siting of hazardous waste facilities--particularly to deal with the unfair 
concentration of risks and costs imposed on host communities compared to the widespread 
distribution of the benefits involved: When already very high safety standards exist for the 
facilities, compensation in the form of improving the communities' health and safety conditions 
in other areas will often leave them far better off in net health and safety, and at a lower cost 
for society at large, than attempting to increase the safety precautions regarding the facilities 
even more at an exorbitant expense. 
detail.10 It is specifically designed to include ethnic conflicts, in which fairness issues are 
ultimately linked to findamental human needs, but it also applies to purely interest-based 
disputes. For illustration we will refer to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over Jerusalem--a 
microcosm of an ethnic conflict which like few others illustrates the challenges of dealing with 
divergent fairness notions and constructing solutions viewed as fair in negotiations. 
5.2.1 Case Study: Positions-Interests-Needs Analysis and Integrative Techniques1 
One integrative method urges parties to begin by analyzing their stakes in the conflict at 
different levels of importance: positions, interests, and needs (Albin, 1990).12 From the 
positions on the "surface" and the interests they incorporate, to the psychological needs at the 
foundation of the structure, these can be viewed as a hierarchy of stakes in a conflict which 
include notions of fairness at different levels or "depths." 
Positions are the set of official demands which parties in conflict bring to the negotiating 
table. They include stances on the nature of a fair solution--the partial or substantive notions 
of fairness by which most negotiations begin (ZartmanLkBerman, 1982:103), and which in 
predominantly distributive negotiations set the parameters or even determine the subsequent 
give-and-take. Positions are claims which include important interests and vital needs, as well 
as high aspirations, bargaining chips, and items aimed at influencing and garnering support 
from constituencies at home and on the other side. They rarely reveal what are findamental 
concerns or priorities, as distinct from what parties hope to get under the best of 
circumstances. Indeed, conventional wisdom holds that good negotiators adopt rigid 
positions which remain ambiguous regarding what items can be compromised, at least until a 
negotiation process is well under way. 
10 We will recall that in the context of integration, "negotiation" refers to redefining and 
combining findarnental concerns to bring about more stable and gainful solutions. It stands in 
contrast to distributive negotiations, in which concessions are exchanged and compromises 
made based on stated positions. 
l 1  The following discussion draws on Albin (1990). 
2 "Positions" have been distinguished from "interests" previously by FisherLkUry (198 l), and 
"interests" from underlying interests or "needs" by Pruitt (1981), PruittLkRubin (1986), and 
Burton (1984). See also Rothrnan (1991). 
Ultimately motivating the positions and the fairness notions they incorporate are basic human 
needs--e.g., identity, security, recognition, and control (Burton, 1984, 1986; Azar, 1983, 1986) 
andlor social and cultural values. The hlfillment of such concerns is typically viewed as 
impossible to compromise. On the other hand, these intangibles may be possible to meet in a 
number of ways, and the hlfillment of one party's needs or values does not have to impede 
upon, but may even enhance, that of another. Yet, parties in conflict typically view their 
needs as mutually exclusive and rule out the option of negotiation--a zero-sum perception 
which is at the root of many current ethnic conflicts in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and 
Europe. 
Between positions and needs are interests which parties seek to achieve or preserve; for 
example, self-determination and control over temtory, use of vital resources, maintenance of 
political stability, demographic superiority, economic development, and strategic strength. 
Sometimes interests are pursued as an end in themselves. In deeply rooted (e.g., ethnic) 
conflicts, by contrast, interests become viewed as institutional options or methods for serving 
the needs which ultimately underlie the dispute. Yet at this level, ethnic disputes often appear 
merely as conflicts over the fair distribution of tangible physical resources, such as land and 
economic assets. 
Below is an example of how a positions-interests-needs framework can be applied to 
mainstream Palestinian and Israeli claims and concerns regarding Jerusalem. Moving up the 
hierarcy toward the positions, notions of faimss and other stakes in the conflict become 
more institutional-political and tangible, rigid, and often too exclusive to serve as the basis 
for a negotiated agreement. By contrast, moving down the hierarchy toward the needs, 
concepts of fairness and other concerns become more psychological and abstract, and more 
flexible as to how they can be fulfilled. Thus, at the level of interests, and even more at the 
level of needs, there is more room to create fairness. 
The analysis positions, interests, and needs permits the use of a range of integrative techniques 
for combining hndamental concerns in a conflict, including apparently opposing fairness 
notions; elaborating new alternatives for a solution; and evaluating the extent to which these 
THE CONFLICT OVER JERUSALEM 
ISRAELI 
POSITIONS 
YmushaZuyim (all of Jerusalem) 
is the eternal capital of Israel 
Maintain self-determination 
Keep the city physically united 
Keep sovereignty over, secure 
free access to Jewish holy sites 
INTERESTS 
Preserve (enhance) Jewish character of 
Jerusalem, including maintaining1 
increasing its Jewish majority 
Ensure security, control over, 
expand Jewish neighborhoods in 
and around East Jerusalem 
Ensure order, safety, freedom of 
movement and residence, and maintain 
sense of normalcy, in entire city 
Attract and facilitate absorption 
of new immigrants 
Promote cultural autonomy and co- 
existence under Israeli sovereignty 
Increase tourism 
Secure international recognition of 





Al-Quds (East Jerusalem) is the 
capital of the Palestinian state 
Achieve self-determination 
(including in ArabEast Jerusalem) 
Gain sovereignty and secure total 
freedom of access to and worship 
at Muslim and Christian holy sites 
Prevent further (gain political 
control over/dismantle) Jewish 
settlements in East Jerusalem 
Preserve Arab character of Jerusalem: 
Bolster Arab institutions, maintain1 
increase size of city's Arab population 
Keep city divided along 1967 Green 
Line to protest status quo; undivided 
in the context of negotiated settlement 
Ensure right of return for all 
Palestinians, including to Jerusalem 
Promote coexistence and cooperation 
between Israeli and Palestinian 
residents of the city only in context 
of negotiated solution involving 
divided or shared sovereignty 
Secure international recognition of 
city as dual, binational capital 
Recognition,Control 
Equality, Identity 
FIGURE: An application of a positions-interests-needs framework to 
Palestinian and Israeli claims and concerns regarding Jerusalem. 
(From Albin, 1990: 12- 13 .) 
address identified concerns. Albin (1990, 1991, forthcoming) identifies three types of such 
integrative strategies: 3 
Through resource expansion techniques, parties enlarge the amount of existing resources 
(e.g., expand the borders of Jerusalem to facilitate the creation of dual municipalities and/or 
capitals in the city); add new kinds of resources (e.g., offers of economic aid to elicit 
concessions); or expand the usage of existing resources (e.g., redefine concepts of 
sovereignty, capital, and statehood to facilitate reconciliation of competing claims to the same 
city). Bchunge strategies, which include various forms of compensation and linkage of 
issues, permit parties to trade concessions based on differences in evaluations and priorities 
among interests (e.g., Palestinian acceptance of Israeli control over the Jewish settlements in 
East Jerusalem in exchange for a right to build a corresponding number of Palestinian 
neighborhoods on the Western side of an enlarged Jerusalem). Functional strategies focus 
on how interests which are too similarly and highly valued to be exchanged may be integrated 
through arrangements involving sharing, division, or delegation (e.g., of sovereign or 
municipal functions, or of access to valued resources). 
In applying this approach, parties would in an informal, private, and nonbinding context share 
information and detailed explanations regarding interests and needs underpinning their official 
stances in the conflict. By defining a number of concerns which are much less exclusive than 
the positions they underlie, and which are often either shared or valued and prioritized 
differently, parties obtain more and more compatible pieces to work with. Through the use of 
resource expansion, exchanges, and functional options parties jointly design new possibilities 
for more integrative solutions. 
This analysis is directly applicable to the common situation in which parties cannot make 
progress in a negotiation, or will not come to the negotiating table at all, because they are 
entrenched in apparently opposing and irreconcilable positions regarding what a "fair" 
solution would be. In the Jerusalem conflict, Israel's deeply held notion of a fair solution at 
the positional level is based on equity (proportionality)14: The sovereignty over all of 
Jerusalem, Israel's eternal capital, must remain in its sole hands, but there is room for 
municipal powers and greater administrative-cultural autonomy for the city's substantial 
13 These concepts and strategies have been used in a model for pre-negotiation in ethnic 
conflict, as described in Rothman's work (e.g., Rothman, 1991). 
I 4 See the discussion of this principle in later section. 
Palestinian minority. Concerns about keeping the city united, with guaranteed free access to 
the holy sites, and safeguarding the Jewish presence in the city overall, are important 
underlying motivations. The perceived fairness of this position is greatly reinforced, if not 
determined, by two factors: the experience of the 1948-1967 period, when divided sovereignty 
entailed a physically divided city in which Jews were denied access to the eastern part (under 
Jordanian rule) and many of their holy sites there were desecrated or destroyed; and the 
notion that Jerusalem is by far most important to the Jewish people, as their historical and only 
spiritual and political center, whereas Arabs and Muslims have two other holy cities in Mecca 
and Medina and an array of political capitals throughout the region. 
The Palestinian mainstream notion of a fair solution, as strongly felt, is based on absolute 
equality between the two sides and their claims to the city. Because Jerusalem is as 
important historically, politically, and spiritually to Palestinians and Arabs as it is to Israelis, 
the sovereignty of the city should be divided between East Jerusalem as the capital of a 
Palestinian state and West Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The most immediate motivating 
concerns on the Palestinian side are the achievement of self-determination, complete control 
over the Muslim and Christian holy sites, and preservation of the Arab presence in and 
character of the city. 
Evidently, these notions of a fair solution are very far apart; they are viewed as irreconcilable 
because "splitting the difference" between the competing notions would require too costly 
concessions for both sides. However, an application of the discussed integrative techniques to 
key interests underlying these notions could give rise to a range of new, more integrative 
options. At once exploiting the fact that some concerns motivating the Israeli and Palestinian 
fairness notions are differently prioritized and valued (see chart), and recognizing the many 
shared interests involved (e.g., concerns about self-determination, control over and access to 
the holy sites, preservation of the Jewish and Arab character of Jerusalem), these options 
could, in effect, redefine and meet central concerns about fairness on both sides. 
For example, at the center of the Palestinain notion is the claim to the right of independent 
political control per se and a secured existence in Jerusalem, while concessions on issues such 
as exact borders, the unity of the city, and freedom of movement within it are viewed as much 
less costly. At the core of the Israeli fairness stance is the concern about maintaining self- 
determination, and securing the unity of and freedom of access within Jerusalem (particularly 
to the Jewish areas, including the holy sites). Thus one could foresee arrangements-- 
elaborated in a few recent plans for Jerusalem--whereby Israel agrees to some form of 
Palestinian "supra-autonomy" or limited sovereign rule over densely populated Arab areas of 
the city, in exchange for a Palestinian commitment to restoring and maintaining its physical 
and functional unity. 
More specifically, in exchange for a Palestinian mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza, with 
sovereignty over the Arab areas of East Jerusalem and the right to build new neighborhoods 
on the western side of an expanded municipal area, Palestinians may accept Israeli rule over 
West Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements in the eastern part, and an expansion of the 
municipal border into today's West Bank. Functionally, municipal powers and services could 
be at once shared, within a joint supra-municipal body ruling a Greater Jerusalem; and divided, 
between Arab and Israeli municipalities in the city. An additional objective would be to 
expand the municipal borders, and control new settlement in the city, in such a way that the 
size of the Palestinian population increases and reaches parity with that of the Israeli 
population, thus eliminating the historical struggle over Jerusalem by demographic means. At 
the same time, because of the expanded city boundaries, Israel would exercise sovereignty 
over at least as much territory as it does today within the current borders (Albin, forthcoming; 
Albin, Amirav& Siniora, forthcoming). Such a scheme would in effect integrate elements of 
the principles of equality, equity, and compensatory justice, and be quite distinct from a 
solution which simply "splits the difference" or strikes a compromise between competing 
fairness principles. 5 
In sum, a positions-interests-needs analysis and integrative strategies can help parties 
overcome intransigent stances on fairness, and lead to solutions viewed as fair by both. The 
approach calls for parties to move from insisting on their respective narrow definitions of 
the conflict, and their narrow concepts of a 'ffair" solution, to examining more 
findamental concerns and broader principles underlying these. In exploring new ways of 
meeting the concerns and principles, these are redefined or reinterpreted, and the fairness 
arguments at the positional level changed. As shown in the case of Jerusalem, divergent 
fairness notions consist of concerns which can provide terms of trade and facilitate agreement. 
15 An example of an outcome of the latter type would involve Israeli sovereignty and 
municipal powers over West Jerusalem and the Jewish areas of East Jerusalem, and 
Palestinian sovereign and municipal powers over the Arab areas of East Jerusalem. A solution 
of this nature would indeed compromise many of the concerns underlying both the Israeli and 
Palestinian notions of a fair solution, and is far less likely to win the support of either side. 
Overall, as in most integrative approaches, fairness notions become a part, and often a central 
part, of the negotiations themselves. 
6. OUTCOME FAIRNESS 
This term refers to two major issues: 
--the fairness principle(s) underlying the allocation (exchange or division) of benefits and/or 
burdens in a negotiated agreement, whether predominantly integrative or distributive; 
and, at least as importantly, 
--the extent to which the agreement is considered fair expost in actually fblfilling the 
expectations about the allocation of gains and costs which parties harbored at its conclusion. 
6.1 Fairness Principles Underlyine Ne~otiated A~reements 
The first issue, unlike the many aspects of fairness discussed so far, has been the focus of 
considerable research, social-psychological and experimental in particular, in a broader 
context. This research has examined principles of fairness regarding the distribution of 
resources at the societal and interpersonal levels in general, termed "distributive justice7' (e.g., 
Deutsch, 1985, 1975). Yet these principles are clearly applicable to negotiations specifically 
(Deutsch, 1973; Zartman&Berman, 1982: 102-109). As there is already a considerable 
literature available on the subject, different norms of outcome fairness are reviewed relatively 
briefly here. Illustrative references are made to proposals for managing or resolving ethnic 
disputes through negotiation--a type of conflict in which outcome (or any) fairness issues have 
been little studied yet figure so prominently. 6 
Specifically, we focus on three major principles--identified by Deutsch (1975), Leventhal 
(1976) and Pruitt (1981)--of which many norms of outcome fairness can be considered 
variations: equity, equality, and need. 
6.1.1 Equity 
The essence of the equity principle is twofold: Resources (rewards) should be distributed 
proportionally to relevant contributions (inputs), and fairness is achieved when each party's 
16 For a discussion of the applicability of many of these principles to issues of outcome 
fairness in radioactive waste management, for example, see Kasperson, ed. (1983), chapter 15, 
in particular. 
ratio of inputs to rewards is the same. Thus injustice is experienced in relation to these ratios 
rather than others' rewards in absolute terms. Relevant contributions may be either qualities 
and endowments (e.g., status, power, skills, wealth, intelligence) or actions and efforts (e.g., 
hours worked, tasks completed, leadership exercised). 
Originating in Aristotle's notion ofjustice as rooted in "balance" and "proportion," the concept 
was subsequently developed by a number of scholars. Sociologist Homans elaborated a quasi- 
economic notion, which later became the foundation of "equity theory". According to this 
notion, fair division is accomplished when net rewards (gains minus costs) are allocated in 
direct proportion to investments made, so that the ratio of profit to investment is the same for 
everyone. Rewards are the goods received in an exchange relationship, e.g., money and 
education, for other goods given up; costs are opportunity costs, i.e., rewards forgone in 
alternative exchange relationships; and investments are contributions made to the exchange, 
e.g., time spent, risks taken, and skills contributed (Homans, 1958, 1961). Similar concepts of 
equity are found in Adams (1965), which explicitly includes negative "rewards" or returns as 
well (e.g., stress suffered in the completion of a job assignment), and Walster, Walster& 
Berscheid (1978), which stresses the importance of perceptions (i.e., ultimately equity is 
established only if and when every party sees that the ratio of net gains to inputs remains 
constant for everyone). 
Two important norms can be viewed as variations of the equity principle: opportunities, 
according to which each party should receive resources proportionally to how well it can use 
or benefit from them (Pruitt, 1972, 1981), thus equalizing fairness with a form of efficiency; 
and the priority principle according to which the "winner," while determined proportionally 
(e.g., through a lottery or voting), gets more than a proportional share of the resources. 
Equity is by far the most widely discussed principle of justice and fairness in the pertinent 
literature, and is frequently applied in negotiated agreements. It has even been termed the 
norm of distributive justice (Pruitt, 1972). Yet equity is probably the most ambiguous of all 
fairness principles, and tends to give rise to an array of conflicting interpretations in any one 
situation. Not only must the nature of relevant inputs and the means to measure their relative 
value be agreed upon, but the worth of the resources to be distributed and the proper 
proportionality between inputs and rewards must also be determined. 
The principle of equity as proportionality is at the center of many schemes for alleviating, 
managing, or resolving ethnic conflicts in the political, economic, and sociocultural spheres. It 
is widely recognized as an obvious standard of fair distribution in ethnic conflict (Lijphart, 
1990), and has been identified as a key instnunent in regulating such conflict successfully 
(Nordlinger, 1972). In these schemes, control over and access to valued resources are 
allocated between different ethnic groups roughly in proportion to their size (number of 
members). They include the sharing of governmental powers within the same state based on 
proportional political representation according to fixed ratios or census (as in Lebanon); forms 
of temtorial and cultural autonomy; and quotas for access to educational opportunities, 
allocation of high offices and other public service appointments, and sharing of public funds 
based on ethnic criteria. Thus attempts are made to achieve fairness among communal groups 
in a society, rather than between individuals (Esman, 1973). 
Powersharing specifically often has the greatest prospects of producing a fair and effective 
solution when the ethnic groups are scattered geograpically and an equitable partition of 
temtory and national resources, if at all possible, would involve great costs--i.e., in terms of 
economic sustainability or the need for extensive population exchanges (Lijphart, 1990). 
With regard to autonomy, the equity principle underlies arrangements whereby ethnic 
minorities are granted cultural-administrative autonomy, or "super-autonomy" which includes 
some limited sovereign functions, under the overall sovereignty of an ethnic majority. Such 
arrangements have been proposed for the Palestinian population as a solution to the issue of 
the Israeli-occupied temtories, including East Jerusalem. They are distinct from the so-called 
"control-model" illustrated by the case of the Arabs within pre-1967 Israel, in which a 
dominant ethnic majority controls most ruling powers and resources, and grants some, but by 
no means proportional or equal, benefits to the subordinate ethnic minority (Lustick, 1979; 
McRae, 1990). 
6.1.2 Equality 
The principle of equality, also termed "impartial justice," holds that parties should receive the 
same (comparable) rewards irrespective of their contributions or needs. The norm finds its 
origins in the Enlightenment and the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Differences 
among individuals (including in their ability to make contributions, so decisive in equity 
theory) were regarded as environmental products. The natural and preferred type of human 
relationships were to be based on equal treatment of all people, and thus the ideal state of 
nature would return. 
The widespread reliance on the equality principle in negotiations is commonly explained in 
terms of the intrinsic appeal of the norm--the grounds on which the equality rule is applied 
tend to be much less questioned than, for example, those of equity--and in terms of its relative 
lack of ambiguity. Yet in many situations the principle poses the basic problems of 
determining what exactly is to be treated equally (see Young, 1991b, for hrther discussion and 
examples); how it is to be applied to a particular bundle of goods which may not be uniform 
or divisible; and how to assure that the outcome indeed is one of equality when parties are 
very unequal in some respect. 
Partly in response to these operational problems, a number of specific interpretations of the 
equality principle have been put forward. A common interpretation of the norm is equal 
shares; that is, a solution which divides resources in equal amounts between parties. Another 
version is compromise "in the middle " or split-the-dzrerence in reference to parties' initial 
positions, yielding a different outcome than equal shares unless opening positions are identical. 
This is typically the notion of a just solution in distributive models of negotiation, as discussed 
earlier. A third application of the equality principle is equal excess, whereby each party 
receives resources corresponding to the value of its best alternative to a negotiated agreement, 
plus half of the remaining resources (Pruitt, 1981; Komorita&Kravitz, 1979). In cases in which 
a burden is to be allocated, the equal sacrifice norm holds that parties' concessions should 
make them suffer equally (Pruitt, 1981). Subtractive justice or null-possession solutions, 
whereby every party to the conflict is denied possession of the disputed resources, could be 
viewed as a special case of the equal sacrifice principle. 
In powersharing arrangements based on proportionality and consensus, an important element 
of equality is introduced into the system when an ethnic minority can rely on a veto power to 
protect its essential (or even other) interests against a ruling by the majority. But the ultimate 
illustration of equality as outcome fairness in ethnic conflict is the division of sovereignty and 
territory, in the sense that both or all groups achieve statehood, with the control over vital 
hnctions and resources that it entails, irrespective of their size or other considerations. 
Within such a solution--e.g., a federation or confederation--important powers can still be 
shared on a basis of equality. Of course, the overall division of the land per se and other 
resources between the groups can still be made according to some other principle (or no 
fairness criterion at all)--as is the case of many proposed two-state solutions to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. 
6.1.3 Need 
A third major principle of outcome fairness is need, also termed compensatory or 
redistributive justice. It stipulates that resources should be allocated proportionally to the 
strength of need alone, so that the least endowed party or parties get(s) the greatest share. In 
other words, the norm sees no fairness in a preservation of the status quo--the proportional 
balance between contributions and gains, which rewards the already well-endowed--but 
regards a solution just only if it contributes to the redistribution of resources and 
establishment of a new order based on equality. Similarly, according to Rawls (1971) 
resources--notably important means of achieving welfare, such as liberty, education, and 
financial resources--should be distributed in a way that the well-being of the weakest or 
poorest is maximized. 
While in practice posing challenges of identifjring, measuring, and comparing relevant wants, 
and determining the extent to which they should be met, the needs principle is often less 
ambiguous than the equity principle: The range of needs potentially relevant to the disputed 
goods is usually more limited than the great variety of attributes which could be considered 
pertinent contributions. Although applied relatively rarely in the international arena, the needs 
standard formed the basis of the United Nations negotiations on a New Economic Order and 
the EEC talks on the Common Agricultural Policy. 
With respect to ethnic disputes, conventional wisdom holds that economic growth and 
enhanced economic opportunities make an effective tool of conflict management: The 
resulting increase in material resources can supposedly satis@ many of the demands for a 
better life and greater justice at the root of such disputes. More sophisticated analyses have 
stressed that unregulated economic growth (and decline) tend to reinforce intergroup 
disparities so typical in ethnic conflict, and that it is rather a wise and conscious distribution 
of economic benefits which can make a difference. Thus one proposed avenue involves 
(re)distributing assets and opportunities such as wealth, income, and employment 
disproportionally in favor of the disadvantaged ethnic community. The long-term objective 
would be to establish intergroup equality and greater harmony. Such schemes of 
compensatory justice could be effective in alleviating ethnic disputes (at least their economic 
causes) particularly at an early stage when demands for partition or sharing of central powers 
are not yet made, or in reinforcing political attempts at dispute resolution and any political 
agreements reached (Esman, 1990). Since the 1969 ethnic riots in Malaysia, an important 
cause of which was economic hardship and increased communal disparities, the Malay 
government has pursued an economic policy of compensatory justice with some success 
(Stubbs, 1990): 
6.1.4 "Superfairness" and Other Principles 
Another principle of outcome fairness includes precedent, whereby a previous comparable 
case or decision serves as the rule for determining allocations in the outcome. Thus it 
encourages parties not to "go below" what has been agreed to date, as in, for example, labor- 
management negotiations over wages (LewickiLkLitterer, 1985). The norm of retribution 
holds that a party guilty of violating some rule in the past is punished by getting less. An 
unusual principle which takes into account parties' preferences to the disputed resources is 
the "no-envy " or 44supe@airness " principle (Foley, 1967; Baumol, 1987; Young, 1992). It 
holds that a certain allocation is fair if, and only if, no party prefers the other's share of 
resources to its own. In most negotiations, "the other's share" would refer to that party's 
share of the particular goods which are disputed rather than the totality of its endowments. 
6.1.5 Some Factors Influencing the Choice of Outcome Fairness Principle 
What forces are important in influencing or determining which principle(s) of outcome fairness 
will be favored or chosen in negotiations? 
Considerable social-psychological research has been conducted on how factors such as age, 
status, gender, type of relationship between parties, goals of parties, culture, and the type of 
issue(s) at stake, influence perceptions of what is "fair" and the choice of particular fairness 
principles in the settlement of distributive issues. According to Piaget (1948), as young 
children grow and develop morally, they move through the stages of endorsing first strict 
equity (accounting for inputs only), then strict equality (disregarding inputs), and last "mature 
equity" (accounting for the circumstances as well as the inputs of the individual). Several 
studies suggest that a relatively strong or successfbl party favors equity while the weaker 
prefers equality, and that women and men tend to endorse equality and equity, respectively 
(see Sarnpson, 1975). 
Further, it has been proposed that need is the predominant standard of outcome fairness in 
intimate relationships or interpersonal negotiations when individual welfare is the common 
goal; equality, when solidarity or the promotion or maintenance of good, long-term relations 
is a shared interest of parties; and equity, in cooperative relationships when economic 
productivity is the primary concern (Deutsch, 1975). Still others have noted that cultures 
placing primary value on competition and productivity (e.g., the United States) tend to 
endorse equity norms, while cultures stressing ,solidarity and cooperation (e.g., social- 
democratic countries) prefer equality (Sampson, 1975). One could indeed identify particular 
groups and areas of negotiation having a common culture or set of norms which influence the 
choice of fairness principle. Thus, in labor-management negotiations precedent tends to be a 
prevailing norm. 
Factors such as status, parties' relationship and goals, and culture in all likelihood also 
influence the specific interpretation and application of any preferred fairness norm, as well 
as the value attached to different types of fairness (e.g., process vs. outcome fairness). A key 
question remains unanswered, however, as to the relative importance of each factor--for 
example, which norm prevails when the negotiators are American women. 
6.1.6 Outcome Fairness as a Balance Between Competing Principles 
The normative principles reviewed often pose questions of interpretation (e.g., what are 
relevant contributions) and operationalization (e.g., how to base an agreement over a single 
indivisible good on equal shares, or how to implement a "superfairness" division when 
eliminating envy requires impeding upon a party's entitlement to the resources). Indeed, many 
negotiations revolve around the task of reaching agreement on the interpretation and 
application, as much as on the choice, of the principle(s) to guide the allocation of resources. 
Recent research has hrther pointed to how olltcome fairness in many contexts must involve a 
balance between a combination of principles, all of which may appear equally applicable, 
which takes into account a wider range of factors and circumstances than any single norm 
can possibly do. Many cases suggest that the more complex the situation--e.g., in terms of 
involving high stakes, such as human lives and/or highly valued and scarce goods; needs or 
contributions of parties which are very different and difficult to compare; and wide differences 
in dependency on agreement among parties--the greater the number of applicable principles to 
be included and weighed carehlly against each other. For example, the. U.S. national formula 
for distributing kidneys among transplant patients involves a mixture of and balance between 
the principles of efficiency (likelihood of the transplant succeeding), need (urgency of a 
transplant) and compensation for disadvantages (medical ability to accept only a small number 
of kidneys), and seniority (amount of time waited to get a transplant) (Young, 1992). 
With regard to environmental negotiations, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer was based on a combination of fairness standards so as to account 
for the varied conditions and needs of the signatory states. Equity was the underlying 
principle for the call for reductions in CFCs proportional to each country's 1986 emission level 
beginning in 1993, thus imposing a greater (unequal) cost of regulation on the industrialized 
states. Compensatory justice was the underlying principle for the provision for financial and 
technical assistance to the South, and their exemption from the stipulated emission reductions 
during the first ten years for development purposes. Finally, the equality norm was expressed 
in the long-term goal of the North and the South sharing the cost burden of regulation on a 
basis of parity, and in the freeze on all countries' emissions at the 1986 levels for the first few 
years (1989-1993). 
A proposed scheme for a global warming agreement strikes a balance between the status quo 
and absolute equality during a transitional period: Rather than imposing the same ceilings on 
all countries, irrespective of their current emissions, or accepting the (unequal) emission levels 
of today, the proposal stipulates reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions which impose about 
an equal degree of hardship from adjustment on the developed and developing countries, with 
the long-term objective of establishing an egalitarian regime. Further, compensatory justice is 
reflected in the suggestion for technological and financial aid to developing countries to 
facilitate their adjustment to the regime (Young&Wolf, 1992). Thus the proposal balances a 
number of considerations--including differences in responsibility for the global warming 
problem, in current emission levels, in ability to bear the costs of regulation, and in need. 
In the search for solutions to ethnic disputes as well, the need for imaginative formulas which 
combine a number of principles rather than rely on a single norm is obvious. In the Israeli- 
Arab conflict over Jerusalem, apart from the proposal already discussed, the plan of Jerusalem 
Mayor Teddy Kollek illustrates such a formula to some extent: At the municipal level, 
Jerusalem Palestinians are urged to vote and run for office in the city council on a basis of 
equality with Israeli residents. In order to compensate for past neglect and their greater 
needs, some of the city's public goods and services should be distributed disproportionally in 
favor of the Palestinian residents. Under the overall umbrella of Israeli rule, some lesser 
"hnctional" elements of sovereignty can be granted to the Palestinian minority (Kollek, 1981, 
1988189). 
6.2 Fairness after the A~reement 
Agreements viewed as fair and legitimate at their conclusion no doubt have greater chances of 
being implemented and enduring than outcomes resulting from a mere confrontation of skill 
and power in negotiations. Yet the norms (or the particular interpretations of them) 
incorporated in an agreement do not necessarily represent an "end-state" form of fairness or 
the final product of the talks: The provisions of an agreement may no longer be considered 
fair expost, but require renegotiation and adjustment. A major aspect of outcome fairness 
thus concerns the extent to which an agreement, in both the short run and the long term, is 
considered legitimate in actually fulfilling expectations of fairness harbored at its conclusion. 
This evaluation will directly affect the prospects of the agreement being ratified and 
implemented by signatory parties; any post-agreement negotiations undertaken to adjust or 
complement it; and its stability and long-livedness. 
A large number of factors may influence parties' evaluations of the fairness of an agreement 
after its conclusion, and we can here only refer to some of them briefly. Domestic 
constituencies, non-governmental organizations, or other bodies less directly involved in the 
negotiations may provide a larger andlor more long-term perspective on an accord, which 
makes its provisions appear unfair in some respect--for example, the allocation of benefits and 
costs between present vs. future generations; or a failure to cover any uncertainties about 
costs through contingent agreements or to allocate the costs of any violations of the 
agreement fairly among parties (e.g., avoid a situation in which one party can defect without 
great losses, while the other's compliance is impossible or extremely costly to reverse). The 
availability of objective, effective criteria and mechanisms for monitoring parties' adherence to 
the agreement and dealing with any violations, and the openness of the operation of the 
agreement (including information about any new costs or risks involved) to public scrutiny are 
other concerns which often arise in evaluations of the fairness of an agreement after its 
conclusion. 
More commonly, however, an agreement may be considered unfair expost because of 
unforeseen developments or changed conditions which transform its distribution of benefits 
and costs among parties (real or perceived). A party's interests, needs, or alternatives may 
change in such a way that the costs involved in honoring the agreement become unreasonable. 
An unexpected relevation that a party "cheated" in the process of negotiating--for example, 
provided false information about real interests or intentions to shape the outcome in its favor-- 
may lead the other parties to judge the agreement illegitimate and repudiate it. They may 
demand renegotiation or refuse any further dealings with the party altogether (Lax&Sebenius, 
1986). Further, an agreement may be viewed as unfair expost, wholly or in part, because one 
or several parties fail to actually comply with it in good faith. The use of non-tariff barriers to 
trade--such as import quotas, export subsidies, and tax rebates to domestic industry--is widely 
recognized as leading to unfair competition and violating principles of free ("fair") trade under 
GATT. In response to the greatly increased use of such barriers concurrently with cuts being 
made in explicit tariff barriers, new negotiations have been undertaken to attempt to reduce 
and eventually eliminate them. 
Outside actors, which are not parties to a particular agreement, can sometimes render it unfair 
expost. Many environmental agreements, including on global climate change and air 
pollution, pose the problem of "fiee rider" states (states which do not sign the agreements to 
avoid the burdens involved, but which at the same time cannot be prevented from enjoying the 
same benefits as participating countries). In some cases, the costs of regulation may be so 
disproportionally paid by a few to the benefit of many others that the long-term durability of 
the agreement depends extensively on reducing the fiee rider phenomenon, for example, 
through international and domestic political pressures. In other instances, noncooperative 
actors can make agreements--including international ones on the management of the Global 
Commons, such as the protection of endangered species--ineffective and unfair by impeding 
the achievement of their stated goals and imposing costs not only on participating parties but 
on the entire world community (Harvard Law Review, 1991). 
New scientific information and technological advances are other factors which may render an 
agreement unfair after its conclusion, and make post-agreement negotiations necessary to 
restore fairness. In environmental agreements being negotiated today, the burdens and 
benefits accorded to future generations can be calculated only on the basis of existing 
technologies and preferences; yet, the interests of future generations, and the advantages and 
disadvantages they will experience from today's regulations, may change drastically with 
scientific and technological advances. 
For any or a combination of these reasons, an agreement judged fair at its conclusion may 
become considered unfair after the fact, and require renegotiation in order not to collapse. 
New actors may have to be included in the process, the allocation of benefits and burdens 
between parties may have to be adjusted, and more flexibility may have to be built into the 
agreement to maintain its fairness over time with changing conditions--for example, through 
contingent agreements. As a result of this post-agreement negotiation process, the principles 
underlying an accord may be reinterpreted or applied in new ways to better serve their 
purposes or replaced by other norms deemed more appropriate. 
7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has identified four classes of fairness issues in negotiations, and analyzed ways in 
which they affect the negotiation process under different conditions. It has proposed that 
when a common notion of outcome fairness (the shape of a fair solution) exists at an early 
stage in negotiations, that notion will tend to coordinate concessions and facilitate agreement. 
When parties remain entrenched in opposing fairness notions, there are still ways in which a 
solution can be reached. Specifically in integrative negotiations, divergent concepts of 
fairness become part of the 'bargaining' itself and could provide terms of trade. A fair 
outcome in many real-world situations cannot rely on a single norm, but must involve a 
combination of and balance between a number of competing principles. After the conclusion 
of an agreement, new and unforeseen circumstances may render it unfair in fact and thus call 
for renegotiation. 
Many relationships between types of fairness have also been discussed. For example, most 
procedures will be considered fair only as they are related to specific situations--notably 
specific outcomes which parties have in mind. Thus, the exchange of equal concessions tends 
to be viewed as fair when an outcome based on equality is foreseen. In many cases, however, 
the problem is exactly the lack of agreement on the substance of a fair solution. Parties may 
then resort to a process and to procedures considered intrinsically fair in some respect, in view 
of the nature of the disputed resources and cultural norms. For example, lotteries may be 
usehl in the United States to help determine sites for hazardous waste storage facilities fairly, 
but few Israelis or Arabs would agree to toss a coin to settle once and for all the issue of 
Jerusalem's status. 
The fairness of a particular outcome is frequently equalized with the fairness of the process by 
which it was produced (e.g., Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987). We have here noted, however, 
that fair processes and procedures do not always lead to solutions viewed as fair anymore than 
outcome fairness is necessarily the result of process fairness. Indeed, when parties can agree 
upon a particular fair solution, a case may be made for employing a process which best 
guarantees its achievement rather than satisfies criteria of fairness (e.g., openness of the 
process to public scrutiny or participation). In short, process and procedural fairness is 
normally only one determinant of outcome fairness. Others include cultural factors and 
structural elements (e.g., a weaker or more needy party may tend to regard the norm of 
compensatory~justice as fair). 
We must beware of single-factor models and explanations of negotiation processes and 
outcomes. Negotiations are not driven by requests for fairness alone. Nor is there, for sure, a 
single universal concept--or application--of fairness which will reflect itself in negotiations. 
Fairness notions are, as we have seen, extremely diverse and vary with the context. But in 
response to the introductory question, 'What--if any--role do notions of fairness play in 
negotiations?', we must minimally conclude that the issue is not whether, but in which ways 
and under which conditions they have an impact. 
Numerous angles of the subject remain to be explored--among them, fairness in relation to 
other factors which affect negotiation such as power and culture, tactical uses of fairness, 
fairness in post-agreement negotiations, and any differences in the stability of outcomes which 
are based on different fairness principles. A number of experimental findings on other aspects 
remain to be tested on actual cases. Research along these lines promises to yield new insights 
which will help us to better understand the science and the art called negotiation and, 
foremost, many ongoing and upcoming negotiations of global significance. 
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